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FOREWORD
These six essays constitute my thesis for the degree dr. oecon.
They are all essays in lahour economics, the first four lie
within the field of labour contract theory. No particular read-
ing order is required, apart from that the first essay, a survey
article, might help putting especially the three next essays in
perspective. Hopefully, this first essay also sheds some light
on what I mean by 'contract theory', a central concept through-
out this thesis. For further information on the contents of
these essays, I refer to the abstracts preceding essays 2, 3, 4
and 6 and succeeding essay 5.
During the time I have worked on this thesis, I have accumulated
debt to many persons. Foremostly, I would like to mention my
supervisor Kåre Petter Hagen and the two remaining members of my
supervising committee, Agnar Sandmo and Jon Strand.
The thesis was written mainly during my three years as a re-
search fellow at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration (NHH). I had the pleasure of spending one of
these years at the London School of Economics (LSE), which I
found enriching in many respects.
Many persons at these institutions have helped me at one point
or another. I would like especially to mention three fellow
doctoral students, and thank them for discussions and friend-
ship: Jan Erik Askildsen, BjØrn Sandvik and Padmini Venkatnaray-
an.
Typing assistance has been offered by several secretaries: Peter
Hansteen did the hulk of the work. Thank you!
Moreover, during my year in London I received financial support
not only from ~mH, but also from the Norwegian Research Council
for Scientific Research (NAVF) and the Bank of Norway.
I doubt whether it is possible to complete a doctoral thesis
without the support of a whole lot of people. I know it sounds
like an empty cliche, but I feel real gratitude towards many of
those people I have not found space to mention in these acknow-
ledgements.
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EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT LABOUR CONTRACTS: AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY
l. Introduction.
A natural first question when embarking on a survey like this,
is why labour contract theory is an interesting topic. Of
course, as a preliminary towards answering this question it is
necessary to get some idea of what labour contract theory is.
Unfortunately, this concept is not very precisely defined. A
broad definition is the following: Labour contract theory is the
study of the terms of exchange in the labour market. The very
simplest form of a labour "contract" would then be the wage rate
paid when labour and money are exchanged simultaneously in a
spot market. However, economists have become increasingly aware
that such spot market models are rather poor at capturing what
really goes on in the labour market. One important issue is that
for most people the value of their human capital is the lion's
share of their total wealth. At the same time it is difficult to
insure oneself against the uncertainty connected with the value
of human capital. Accordingly, we would expect labour contracts
to include implicit insurance arrangements. Moreover, the
employer-employee relationship is often long-term, and both
parties tend to invest in relationship-specific capital. Long-
term contracts are called upon to lessen the vulnerahility
stemming from such relationship-specific investments. On the
other hand there are large problems when it comes to foreseeing
all eventualities, specifying the contract elements, verifying
what has actually happened and enforcing the contract. Labour
markets abound with informational problems: When a wor-ker is
hired, there is a lot the employee does not know about his
future job, and much the employer does not know about his pro-
spective worker. Also at later stages of the employment rela-
tionship will there be asymmetric information - as regards the
true profits of the firm, the workers' effort levels, the work-
ers' alternative opportunities. Also in many other ways real
labour markets will differ from simple spot market exchange.
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Of course, phenomena like these prevail in many other markets
too. Labour contract theory is but an application of more gene-
ral insights. Still, I believe the labour market offers the most
important examples why the study of more complicated contracting
processes is important.
If one accepts the above, broad definition of labour contract
theory, it is rather easy to argue that this theory is interest-
ing and important. One only has to argue that it is important to
have as realistic as possible a picture of the labour market,
the market which is perhaps the most important for people's
daily lives.
The drawback with such a broad definition is that it makes con-
tract theory almost synonymous with labour economics. In what
follows I will restrict myself to trying to convey the main con-
tents of three strands of literature which conventionally have
been labelled "contract theory". First, the original "implicit
lahour contract theory" of the mid-seventies concentrated on the
role of the firm as an insurer against uncertainty about the
value of the workers' human capital. This theory is presented in
section 2. A later stream of articles focused on the implica-
tions of asymmetric information between firm and workers con-
cerning the true state of nature. In section 3 I present this
theory, and argue that perhaps too much attention has been paid
to this line of research. Finally, in section 4 we will have a
look at what can be termed "transaction cost" contract theory.
This body of theory concentrates on the costs of writing, veri-
fying and enforcing contracts. One reaction to such transaction
costs would be to rely on unwritten, tacit agreements, enforced
by the parties' concern for their reputation. As I see it, this
is implicit contract theory in the true sense. He will also have
a look at the use of noncontingent contracts in combination with
damage measures as a response to such a situation.
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2. The Firm as an Insurer.
Azariadis (1975), Baily (1974) and Gordon (1974) count as the
seminal papers in labour contract theory. Surveys of this early
literature can he found in Sargent (1979) and Azariadis (1981).
The basic assumption in this literature is that workers cannot
insure themselves against fluctuations in their labour income,
in some unspecified manner due to moral hazard problems. How-
ever, the firms which employ the workers can overcome these
informational problems: They know whether an employee's low
income can be explained by an unfortunate state of nature or by
low effort. This implies that the employment relationship does
not only include a sale and purchase of units of labour, but an
implicit insurance arrangement as well. In the case where the
firm is risk neutral while its workers are risk averse, this
will result in a constant wage across states of the world.
This is easily shown in a simple model. The model is a two peri-
od one. In period O the contract is agreed upon, in period I
production takes place. In period l, one of S states is real-
ized. The probability of a state s is ~ . The firm is assumed tos
maximize expected profit, expressed as:
(1)
w denotes wages and L employment in state s. f is a productions s
function, and we assume f' > O, fli < O, limL-+-O f' (L) = co and
lirn_ f'(L) = O. e can be thought of as multiplicatively
L-+-co S
separable technological uncertainty, or alternatively, as an
uncertain price of the output in state s.
To attract workers in period O, the firm must offer a represen-
tative worker a level of expected utility at least equal to U,
presumably determined in the labour market. We write this as:
u = L: ~ {r u(w) + (l-r ) u(R)} ;> Us s s s s (2)
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Here U denotes expected utility, u is ex post utility. We assume
marginal utility to be positive, but diminishing, implying risk
(l-r ) is thus the percentage of workerss
being laid off in this state. We assume that layoffs take place
aversion. r is the percentage of workers under contract retain-s
ed in a given state.
by random draw, implying that rand (l-r ) are the individuals s
probabilities of work and layoff. R is the "reservation wage",
i.e., the monetary value of the benefits and costs accruing to a
laid-off worker. This could include wage in new employment,
value of leisure, public unemployment benefits, the psychologi-
cal strains of unemployment, etc. It is restrictive to assume
that leisure etc. has a monetary value independent of the wage
level. With a more general specification our results would not
survive exactly in the form presented here, but much of their
flavour would remain.
Note further that condition (2) tacitly assumes that a worker
either works a "full day" or is laid off. This is a restrictive
assumption, to be commented upon below.
Also, note that we have presupposed that the firm deals indivi-
dually with every worker. However, most of our results will
rather easily carry over to a unionized setting - as long as we
assume that the firm and the union strike an efficient bargain.
In other models of union behaviour things would be more compli-
cated. See Oswald (1985) for a survey of recent trade union
theory.
The firm wants to maximize (l) given (2). Note that we can write
L = r L, where E is employment in the best state. A is thess·
Lagrangian multiplier associated with the constraint. The first-
order conditions for an interior solution are:
+ A4> ru' (w ) = Os s s (3)
4> (0 f' (L ) - w ) L + A4> (u(w ) - u(R» = Os s s s s s (4 )
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Condition (3) can easily be restated as:
U I (w ) = E
s A ( 3 I )
This condition implies that marginal utilities for employed
workers are constant across states of nature. With u being con-
cave, we then know:
w = ws \1 s ( 5 )
The wage is constant no matter whether the firm experiences good
or bad times.
This result is perhaps not very surprising. We know from insur-
ance theory (Arrow (1971), Borch (1962» that efficient risk
sharing between two parties implies that their marginal rates of
substitution between consumption in any pair of states should he
equal. If one party is risk neutral, this party will carry all
the risk. Of course, this points to a rather straightforward
generalization of our model. Suppose firms were risk averse.
Their ex post utility function over profit is v, ex post profit
in a state s is n . Efficient risk sharing would then require:s
U I (w )
S
'i1 s, t ~ s :j: t (6)
For a risk neutral employer the right hand side of (6) is 1, in
turn implying Ws = Wt. Azariadis (1981) points out that "strict
invariance of wages to the state of nature is not an essential
element in the theory of labor contracts. The essence of these
contracts is rather that wages differ from the marginal product
of labor by an insurance indemnity in adverse states of nature
and hy a premium in favourable states."
But note that even if the workers are relieved of all uncertain-
ty concerning the wage level in our model, they still face risk
concerning the value of their human capital: They face the risk
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of layoff. Let us now turn to the study of the firm's employment
of labour. Using (3'), condition (4) can be restated as
follows:
e f'(L) = w-s s
lu' (w) (u(w) - U(R» t;j s (4' )
This condition says that at optimum the value marginal product
of labour should equal, not the wage, but something which can be
thought of as the shadow cost of labour. This shadow cost con-
sists of the wage minus a term Azariadis (1975) names the "mar-
ginal risk premium". This is the monetary value to a worker of a
marginal reduction in the probability of layoff in a given
state.
By concavity of u, we know:
'( ) < u(w) - ueR)u W Rw - (7)
Taken together with (4'), this implies (when w > R):
e f' (L ) < Rs s t;j s (8 )
This condition characterizes the optimal employment level as
long as there is unemployment. It implies that in our contract
model employment is higher than in a Wa1rasian spot market model
of the labour market (where e f'(L ) = R). This result is rat-s s
her intuitive. Our set-up bars the possibility that the firm can
insure its workers against the risk of layoff by paying them
redundancy pay. It is therefore optimal for the firm to employ
more workers than would have been productively efficient, as a
partial insurance against layoffs.
But even if employment is higher than with Walrasian spot mar-
kets, the unemployment in our model is ex post involuntary: The
retained workers receive a wage exceeding their value marginal
product and opportunity wage. Furthermore, at this wage, the
laid-off workers would have preferred to work. But as the unem-
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ployment in this model is the result of voluntarily agreed con-
tracts, it is voluntary in an ex ante sense.
Note that we so far, rather arbitrarily, have presupposed that
worksharing is not possible. Any reduction in the employment
level therefore takes the form of layoffs. Intuitivelyone would
think it preferable to share unemployment between all workers
instead of placing the whole burden on a selected few. In con-
tract theory, as in labour economics in general, it is necessary
to assume some sort of nonconvexities to make layoffs the ratio-
nal choice over worksharing. I.e., it is for some reason more
profitable to layoff one worker instead of marginally reducing
the workday for all workers. (See e.g. Mortensen (1978), Rosen
(1985), FitzRoy and Hart (1985), Lommerud (1986) and Burdett and
Wright (1986).) These reasons might be technological, or that
the opportunity value of time is larger with layoffs than with
worksharing (e.g. because totally laid-off workers more easily
can find alternative employment), or that the tax system treats
layoffs and worksharing differently.
To sum up so far: If somebody hoped that early labour contract
theory should provide a microeconomic underpinning for Keynesian
wage rigidity, they must have been disappointed. True, these
models predict rigid wages, but the firms do not singlemindedly
determine employment by equating the workers' value marginal
product with this rigio wage. In fact, in the model investigated
so far, employment is too high compared to a Walrasian situ-
ation, and unemployment is voluntary in the sense that it origi-
nates from voluntary contracts.
Private Unemployment Insurance.
As we have seen, early contract theory included an ad hoc ban on
private unemployment insurance. This led to ex post involuntary
unemployment, but still an employment level higher than with
spot markets. How does these results change if we allow the firm
to pay laid-off workers a redundancy payment, b ? We must thens
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deduct froM profits b (L-L ), and the utility of a laid-offs s
worker will be u{b +R). With these alterations, we will have thes
following first-order conditions for an interior optimum:
u' (w ) L (9)= ~ O ss
u' (b +R) L 'il (10)= ~ ss
0 f' (L ) b A. [u(w ) -u{b+R)] "i1 (11)= w ss s s s E s s
Conditions (9) and (10) imply that wages are constant across
states an~ that laid-off workers will be given the same utility
as those retained" i.e. :
w = w = b + Rs s 'il s (12)
Using (12), (II) can he rewritten as:
o f'{L) = Rs s "i1 s (13)
In other words, the employment level is Walrasian. The intuition
is straightforward: Private unemployment insurance is used to
make the workers indifferent be twaen being laid off or retained.
Therefore, the employment decision is left with the firm, which
sets employment at the efficient level. Remember that the reason
why employment was higher than the Walrasian level in the previ-
ous model was that as redundancy pay was not allowed, the firm
wanted to give the workers at least some insurance against lay-
offs by keeping employment high. When redundancy payment is
included in the firm's policy kit, this motive obviously vanish-
es.
An argument against the present model is that we observe preci-
ously little private unemployment insurance in real life. But
why is this? Several authors have focused on informational prob-
- 10 -
lems: It is difficult to monitor the extent of laid-off workers'
search for new jobs, or to get workers truthfully to reveal
their true alternative opportunities. (See e.g. Geanokoplos and
Ito (1985), Moore (1985), Kahn (1985).) Shapiro and Stiglitz
(19R4) point out the disciplining effect of unemployment: ~o be
fired for shirking is a harsher penalty with high unemployment.
If fired shirkers receive severance pay as other laid-off work-
ers, such payments obviously reduce the disciplining power of
unemployment. Another possible explanation for the lacking pri-
vate unemployment insurance might be the following: The costs of
supporting thousands of workers for months or years of unemploy-
ment in a deep slump might be very substantial. So even if the
firm behaves approximately risk neutrally towards small vari-
ations in the wage level, it might be risk averse towards such
substantial payments of redundancy pay. We know for instance
that the possibility of bankruptcy makes a risk neutral firm
behave as if it were averse against huge losses. One might then
think that private unemployment insurance should be undertaken
by private insurance companies with larger financial strength.
However, such companies would encounter an adverse selection
problem (not accounted for in the present model): Presumably the
workers themselves (and their employers) know their own layoff
ris~ better than an outside insurance company.
Still another explanation of lacking private redundancy pay is
hinted at by Jon Strand (19R3). Strand suggests that private
unemployment insurance could drive out public unemployment in-
surance. I feel this could be a valid explanation, but it has
not yet been explicitly modelled in a framework where the gov-
ernment acts rationally. I believe the way to go is to model the
situation as a game between government and firms. The ability to
commit oneself to a strategy will be very important for the
solution. Further, I expect that a model along these lines might
predict that there might be no private unemployment insurance at
all. This is interesting, because the explanations above seem to
explain why there is less than complete private unemployment
insurance, not why there is none at all.
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Ex Post Mobility and New Entrants.
A crucial assumption in early labour contract theory is that
workers are immobile ex post, or that they can commit themselves
to stay on in the firm even if the wage should fall below the
opportunity wage. This might be justified: We can picture that
when a worker enters a firm he undertakes relationship-specific
investments (not modelled) which severely limit his ex post
mobility. However, I find it interesting to examine the opposite
extreme assumption, that there are no mobility costs at all. I
will here present a simple model based on Holmstrom (1983). It
turns out that this situation is best modelied with production
taking place in two periods. In period one the contract is ent-
ered, and production takes place with a known productivity para-
meter. Subscript s = o refers to values of variables in this
period. In period two, as before, one of s = I, ..., S states
occur.
The firm's maximization problem is:
Max IT = ø f(L ) - WoLo + ES'" {e f(L r ) - w Lr} (14 )o o s=l~s -s oss O s
s . t.
u (w ) " u (R )s s 'O s (16)
o <; r <; ls IJ s (17)
As the reader will have noted, I have (rather arbitrarily)
chosen a model where private unemployment insurance is not
allowed. Moreover, I have now (realistically) assumed that the
opportunity wage R can vary with the state.s
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The first-order conditions are (with A and y being the Lagrang-
ian multipliers associated with the constraints (15) and (16»:
- L + A u' (w )o o (18)
e f'{L)o o (19)
e {f'(L)-w}L +A{U{W)-U{R)})O I1Ss s sos s
with strict equality if r < ls (20)
- <P L r + A<P ru' (w ) + y u' (w ) = Osos s s s s 'il s (2l)
Now, if the constraint (16) does not bind, y = O. A comparison
of (lR) and (21) then yields w = w il s. On the other hand, ifs o
(H;) does hind, we know that w = R . Taken together this meanss s
that (21) can he replaced hy:
w = rna x [w R] ri Ss o, s (21' )
Let us assume that Rand e jR increase in s. This means that as s s
"better state" implies that both internal and external produc-
tivities (measured bye and R ) rise, while e rise the most.s s s
(21') then implies that the wage will be constant in bad states,
but at a certain point it will start to rise with R , in orders
to prevent the firm from losing wo rkers. This partial insurance
arrangement is paid for hy the workers accepting a lower wage in
period l than they would otherwise have had. This is why it was
essential to use a model framework with production in two peri-
ods: Insurance is prepaid.
Holmstrom describes this as second period wages being "upward
mobile, downward sticky". I think this is an unfortunate use of
terms. In a multi-period model, wages can be upward and downward
mobile or upward and downward rigid over time, depending on
which states occur in any pair of time periods.
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Note further that if we assume there are two generations of
workers, one arriving ex post, i.e., in period 2, and that there
is a ban on seniority wage differentiation, then we will be in a
situation almost as if all workers were ex post mobile, even
though the senior workers are ex post immobile. The intuition is
clear: Newentrants are per definition mobile. If the firm wants
to recruit new workers, it must pay them at least R . But as news
and old workers in this setting must receive the same wage, this
applies also for the immobile senior workers. A more thorough
treatment of this question is found in Lommerud (1987).
More generally: The so-called insider-outsider literature (See
e.g. Lindbeck and Snower (1986) and Carruth and Oswald (1986»
takes as a starting point that otherwise homogeneous workers
cannot be given differentiated wages according to seniority. The
traditional focus in this literature has been the involuntary
unemployment among newentrants that might result. But it turns
out that a ban on seniority wage differentiation also carries
implications for the senior workers' opportunity to buy implicit
insurance from their firm. If the wage in a state contains an
implicit insurance indemnity, this benefit must also be given to
new entrants. But the newentrants cannot be made to pay for
this insurance: They are mobile, so they would not stay in the
firm in bad states if wages fell below the opportunity wage. And
they are not around in the first period to prepay for the insur-
ance. The presence of a generation of younger workers will
therefore severely limit the old workers' possibility to buy
insurance from their employer. It might therefore be justified
to ask if the role of the firm as an insurance contrivance has
been exaggerated?
3. Asymmetric Information Contracts: A Blind Alley?
When early labour contract theory, properly understood, turned
out to explain inefficiently high involuntary unemployment
rather poorly, attention shifted to models of asymmetric infor-
mation. More precisely, the firm was viewed as ahle to ascertain
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ex post the true state of the world, while the workers were
not.
In one particular setting the introduction of asymmetric infor-
mation about the true state turns out not to matter. Let us
start with this case.
Our starting point will be the symmetric information model with
private redundancy pay allowed. This model has first-order con-
ditions (9) - (11). Assume now that this model is altered so
that only the firm observes the true state. But in this frame-
work the firm has no incentive to misrepresent the true state of
nature. The wage is not state-contingent, consequently it cannot
be changed by lying about the state. But let us assume that the
firm lies about the true state to alter the employment level.
With symmetric information, employment is Walrasian. Reducing
employment marginally saves the firm w - b. At the same time it
loses production of value R. As w = b + R, this means that
profits remain unchanged. Further reduction of unemployment,
saves the firm w - b, but the reduction in produced value
exceeds R. Hence, profit is reduced. By the same line of reason-
ing we could also show that it does not pay to lie to increase
the employment above the Walrasian level.
This model includes three crucial assumptions:
- the firm is risk neutral
- the utility function is separable in consumption and leisure
- the firm uses redundancy paYMents to equalize the utility of
retained and laid-off workers.
By changing anyone (or several) of these assumptions, we can
create models where asymmetric information matters, e.g. in the
sense that the employment level will be non-Walrasian. Grossman
and Hart (1981), Hart (1983) and Azariadis (1983) concentrate on
a model where the firm is risk averse. Chari (1983) and Green
and Kahn (1983) focus on the case where workers have a more
general utility function. Only recently Oswald (1986) has inves-
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tigated an asymmetric information model with no redundancy pay-
ments.
In this survey I will pay most attention to the Grossman-Hart
framework, but also rather brieflyoutline the consequences of
allowing more general utility functions.
The Grossman-Hart-Azariadis Version.
All asymmetric information labour contract models more or less
follow the same pattern. First, one has to construct a rationale
for the firm to misrepresent the true state, either by overstat-
ing or hy understating it. As only the firM observes the state,
this means contracts cannot be conditioned directly on the
state. ~e secon~ best thing to do is to condition the contract
on some observable variable that affects the firm's profits. In
these lahour contract models the wage is tied to the employment
level, as wage and employment are the only obser-vabLes. Whether
under- or overemployment relative to the Walrasian employment
level occurs, depends on the particular set-up. This theory is,
in fact, nothing but an application of more general theories of
hidden information and non-linear pricing: It is an example of
how price is tied to quantity in order to convey a signal of
which "type" you trulyare.
I will here present a simplified model based on Grossman and
Hart's work. Hopefully, this model captures some of the most
important insights from this work in an easily accessible mann-
er.
Grossman and Hart's basic premise is that the firm is risk
averse. This might he hecause the shareholders have not been
able to diversify away all the firm's risk (there is some un-
diversifiahle risk or there are big shareholders for whom the
shares in this company constitutes a significant part of their
wealth), or because the firm's decisions are influenced hy risk
averse managers. We also know that the possibility of bankruptcy
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can make the firm behave as if the firm were extremely averse of
very bad states (Farmer (1984, lQ85), Kahn and Scheinkman
(1985}).
In the asymmetric information case, such risk aversion would
imply that the firm would like its workers to take a wage cut in
adverse states. But with unobservable states, this would give
the firm an incentive always to claim that the state is ter-
rible, to profit from correspondingly low wages.
For simplicity, I will assume here that there are only two sta-
tes, G (Good) and B (Bad). I will also assume that the represen-
tative worker is risk neutral. Can this simplification be justi-
fied? In this model the firm wants the workers to carry some
risk. One way of looking at things is the following: After pro-
viding the workers \'lith complete insurance, the firm wants to
buy back some insurance from its employees. By assuming u" = O,
we isolate the firm's insurance purchase from the workers - and
it is this purchase that is particularly interesting in this
framework. The siMplifying assumption of risk neutral workers
highlights the huge difference between the early contract theory
and the Grossman-Hart model. In the symmetric information model
the key issue was the workers' desire to buy insurance from
their employer. Now we focus on the firm's desire to buy insur-
ance. And even if we assume here that this insurance is bought
from the employees of the firm, it could just as well have been
from anybody else unable to observe the true state. The key
results would still remain (Hart and Holmstrom (1985}).
The firm is taken to maximize expected utility of profits, IT.
whe re it = 0 f(L ) - Ws s s s s = B, G (22)
Here W denotes the total wage bill paid in state s. We assumes
this wage bill is divided equally among the workers under con-
tract, either because there is worksharing or redundancy pay-
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ment. One convenient way to model this is to assume that there
is one worker who can sell more or less of his time to the firm.
The reservation price of a unit time is R. This means that to
attract units of labour from the (risk neutral) worker, the
following condition must be fulfilled:
(23)
The firm also has to satisfy the following truth-telling (or
incentive cornpatihility) constraints:
(24)
(25)
Condition (24) says that if the good state has occurred, the
firm should not be able to increase its profits by reporting B
instead of G. Condition (25) has a similar interpretation. From
the discussion above, we should expect (24) to bind and not
(25). This is indeed the case, which also can be shown formally
(along the lines of Hart (1983, Appendix 3». The binding con-
dition (24) says that the firm must be induced not to under-
represent the state.
It might be instructive to rewrite (24) as:
(24' )
This implies that if we want WB to be lower than WG, then incen-
tive compatibility demands L < L . In this sense we can viewB G
the firm as facing an increasing function n(L), or in other
words, the wage to he conditioned on the employment level.
Note that condition (24') implies something about the gap
between WG and WB for given LG and LB. It says nothing about the
absolute level of WG and WB. This is determined by (23). We
should therefore expect (23) to be hinding, which can also be
shown formally from the first-order conditions of the problem.
- lA -
I will now take the firm's optimization prohlem to be the maxi-
mization of (22) subject to (23) and (24). The first-order con-
ditions for an interior optimum are (with A and a being the
Lagrangian multipliers associated with the constraints):
(26)
(27)
(28)
- v' ('It)~ + A~ + a~ ro = OB B B \, (29)
From (2A) we have that A
written as:
= v' ('It ) + a. Usinq this,G - (26) can be
e f'(L) = RG G (30)
This means that we will have Walrasian employment in the good
state.
Correspondingly, from (29) we have v'('ltB)
into (27) and rearranging terms, we get:
e
G= A + a e-. Inserting
B
(31)
This implies:
(32)
In the bad state there will be underemployment relative to the
Walrasian level.
One ~lay of interpreting this result is the following: Only in
the good state has the firm an incentive to misrepresent the
state. But as it is less costly for the firm to cut employment
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in the bad state than in the-good one, an employment cut can
therefore be used to prove that the adverse state really has
occurred. We have modelled the firm as employing only one input,
namely labour. A firm which uses many inputs can distort any or
several of its input decisions to signal that it tells the
truth, not only the employment of labour. Note how closely
related this is to e.g. Rotschild and Stiglitz' (1976) account
of how price- quantity ties can be used in the insurance market
to segregate bad and good risks.
Moreover, note that the firm is worse off under asymmetric than
under symmetric information. It must use resources to prove it
is telling the truth. Formally, the asymmetric information
problem equals the symmetric one with an added constraint.
Hence, the opportunity set will generally be smaller. This means
that the firm would like to give the workers insight into the
real situation of the firm, were it able to. Public auditing,
the representation of labourers on boards, etc., might be seen
as attempts to lessen the costs of asymmetric information.
Discussion.
Of course, a crucially important question in this context is
whether, in fact, there is, or is not, asymmetric information in
the sense described. Note that this not only requires that there
is asymmetric information at the time the contract is entered
into, but also that the truth will not be disclosed at any later
stage. E.g., the quality of the state should influence profits.
And a large firm with many shareholders would presumably find it
troublesome in the long run both to disguise its true profits
and at the same time let the shareholders benefit from higher
profits. And an optimal contract could include punishments for a
lying firm, effective from the time the true state is deduced,
which would prevent the firm from cheating without the employ-
ment level having to be distorted. Kovenock and Sparks (1985)
have pointed out that employee stock ownership plans might play
a role as an "automatic punishment" of the firm: Profit cannot
- 20 -
accrue to the shareholders without the workers also benefiting.
Admittedly, things would be different in small family companies
or in firms which do not expect to stay in business. Here asym-
metric information might playa more important role.
Because of arguments like these, Oliver Hart has recently begun
to model asymmetric information models where it is the managers
who have the better information. Managers, supposedly, can con-
sume invisibly any extra profits generated from cheating, e.g.
by working less hard. But there are problems also with this kind
of models. We know that shareholders (or anybody else who par-
tially or wholly acts as insurers for the managers) can disci-
pline the managers in two ways. First, corresponding to the
model above, they can use direct incentive schemes, which might
call for the managers to distort labour use (or use of any other
input) to prove that a bad state has occurred. But managers are
also disciplined indirectly by the managerial labour market (see
e.g. Fama (1980». If future employers of the managers judge
managerial quality according to attained results, presumably
this would be a very effective check against the managers under-
stating the state too much and "eating up" the profits.
Furthermore, a firm normally has a whole hierarchy of managers,
perhaps with conflicting interests and personalities. Managerial
asymmetric information models tacitly assume that all these
managers collude in misrepresenting the true state. But with
many managers and extensive lying, there is always the chance
that the truth will be revealed.
And finally, large scale managerial consumption of company pro-
fits would, I think, be rather conspicous. The opposite assump-
tion, that such consumption is invisible, can certainly be true
only within limits.
Another objection against this theory could be the following:
One might find that it is not credible for workers to demand
that their employer should sack some of them in order to prove
that a bad state has occurred. One interpretation of such a
- 21 -
statement might be this: In a m00el slightly different from that
above, with no redundancy pay to laid-off workers, the laid-off
workers will envy those retained. It might be impossihle ex ante
to write binding contracts which specify such ex post ineffici-
encies. He have so far, naively, assumed that any contract can
be enforced. In Section 4 we will turn to what I find is one of
the most interesting issues in contract theory, namely the forms
contracts might take when there are limits to their enforce-
ability.
Taking these reservations together I believe that perhaps toa
much research effort has gone into investigating models of this
kind, but the reader will note that I cautiously have put a
question mark after "hlind alley" in this section' stitie.
The Chari-Green-Kahn Version.
So far, we have restricte0 our attention to the case where the
workers' utility is separable in consumption and leisure. I.e.,
the money value of leisure is independent of the wage income
level. If most of the utility accruing to a laid-off worker
stems from unemployment benefits or wages earned in alternative
employment, this might be a valid formulation. If not, this is a
simplification. Had we used the more general utility function
U(Wsls' -ls) (where ls is individual labour supply in state s),
all aur results would have been more complicated. Among other
things, the firm would then have an incentive to misrepresent
the true state of the world even if it is risk neutral. Chari
(1983) and Green and Kahn (1983) have used this to construct a
model of asymmetric information labour contracts along a route
alternative to that of Grossman and Hart.
Let us take as an example the utility function u = g(w l )-~ ,s s s s
where g' > O and got < O. In a model with symmetric information,
with a risk neutral firm, and in which the firm buys labour
only from one worker (which, as mentioned above, in an economic
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sense corresponds to worksharing being allowed), the maximiza-
tion problem will be as follows:
Max
W , Ls s
II = E <I> {e f(L) - N }s s s s s (33)
s. t. (34)
The first order conditions are:
1g' (W ) = -s X, (35)
e f'(L) =x,s s (36)
These conditions imply that total money income W will be helds
constant across states, whereas the labour supply will be larger
the better the state. This is a quite natural result given the
utility function: The worker has a preference against variations
in Waver states, but is indifferent as to uncertainty abouts
L . Therefore, he is insured against variations in \'1 , but thes . s
firm wants him to work harder the higher is his productivity.
Now, the i~portant thing is that this gives the firm an incen-
tive to overrepresent the true state: In a hetter state the
worker is given the same income, but works harder. In an asym-
metric information model, this result will lead to overemp1oy-
ment in good states. The firm must buy more labour in good
states to prove that it is speaking the truth. Chari (19A3) and
Green and Kahn (1983) have shown that this kind of reasoning
goes through as long as leisure enters the utility function as a
normal good. If we combine the Grossman-Hart model and the
Chari-Green-Kahn model (risk averse employers, more general
utility functions) and allow for many states of the world, we
will find that it is indeterminate whether we get over- or
underemployment relative to the Wa1rasian level. The reader must
determine for himself (herself) which of these two effects em-
pirically is likely to play the most important role.
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4. Contracts with Transaction Costs.
Transactions are not costless. It is costly to foresee any even-
tuality relevant to the transaction, to write the contract, to
gather information, to verify what actually has happened, and to
enforce the contract. These costs are referred to as "transac-
.tion costs". In economics this concept is perhaps foremostly
associated with the name of Oliver Williamson (e.g. 1975, 1983).
A parallell focus within social anthropology is associated with
Frederik Barth (e.g. 1966).
Many different attempts have been made at including such costs
in a theory of transactions, or "contracts". But to model these
costs in anything near a general way would be extremely complex.
Instead, numerous more ad hoc models have heen developed, focus-
ing on more partial aspects of the problem. I will here limit
myself to investigating twa such sets of models. First, I will
study models of "reputational enforcement", i.e., how the fear
of loss of reputation partly can substitute for verifiable and
enforceable contracts. Further, I will look at to which degree
the use of noncontingent contracts in combination with damage
measures can substitute for complex contingent contracts. This
approach excludes the discussion of many related issues of
interest, see e.g. Hart and Holmstrom (1985) for more complete
references. Note also that we have define~ the gathering of
information as a transaction cost, in this sense the literature
on asymmetric information contracts can he seen as a variant of
transaction costs contract theory.
Reputational enforcement
We will take as our starting point that contracts cannot be
enforced by a third party. This rules out the writing of con-
tracts in the conventional sense. But we can still have self-
enforcing agreements, i.e., agreements which neither party has
an incentive to deviate from. Much attention has been paid to
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the case where the fear of not being ahle to recruit business
partners in the future disciplines the parties from breaching
the contract. This we will call reputational enforcement. We
will discuss this phenomenon with basis in a model which can be
seen as a labour market adaption of Klein and Leffler's (1981)
simple and seminal model of reputational enforcement in the
market for high quality goods. Reputational enforcement in the
labour market has also been discussed e.g. by Holmstrom (1981),
Strand (1984), Carmichael (1984) and Bull (1987).
~'lhena firm enters into business it undertakes a nonrecoverable
investment I. At later stages it uses labour as its only input.
Lt is the employment level at time t. The model is set in dis-
crete time. Workers who at the outset of a period take on em-
ployment in a firm are completely immobile for the duration of
the period. The discount factor o measures not only the time
preferences of the agents, but also length of period. Ceteris
paribus, a lower discount factor signifies longer periods, and
thereby more serious immohility.
We assume that the production function f(·) is concave with
positive first-order derivatives. The price of the firm's single
output is l at all dates.
We can now express the net present value of profits as:
(37)
wt denotes wages paid at time t.
We will now assume that the firm cannot commit itself at the
start of a period to pay a certain wage in that period. As work-
ers are immobile, this leaves them in a vulnerable position. Of
course, the assumption that wages are noncontractable is only
credible if "wages" is interpreted in a broad sense, including
e.g. job satisfaction, promotion possihilities, etc., or that
the contract is very long term.
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To highlight some main insights, I will model workers' expecta-
tions in a somewhat ad hoc manner. I will assume that a firm
which in one perioa pays a low wage, in the next period suffers
from a bad reputation, and consequently experiences problems in
keeping and recruiting workers.
We assume that workers have adaptive expectations. With the
simplest form of adaptive expectations, we can express the
firm's "reputation" (i.e. what all workers expect the firm to
pay in the future) as
u t =1= 1 (38)
An alternative concept of reputation would be to envisage that
every individual worker has his private view of how the firm has
treated him and other workers in the past. It would then be
interesting to study the process of how a reputation spreads
(see e.g. Strand (1984».
With adaptive expectations it is somewhat difficult to model the
reputation of a newly started firm. I will here assume that
there exists a firm which in all respects (except starting date)
is equal to the newly started firm. If these firms have the same
levels of initial investment, I assume that they have the same
reputation. These assumptions mean that when it comes to repu-
tation building it is "as if" a firm has existed forever. I
agree that this treatment of a newly started firm is not wholly
satisfactory, but no obvious alternative stands out.
We now postulate that the firm faces the following labour supply
function:
r::J t (39)
sLt denotes labour supply. R denotes a "market level" of reputa-
tion. y is a function which measures how strongly the firm will
lose or attract workers if its reputation deviates from R. We
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can imagine that workers to a varying degree have undertaken
relationship-specific investments in this or other firms. This
justifies thinking of y as being a smooth function. Alternative-
ly, with free mobility at the end of a period a firm would have
been able to recruit as many workers as wanted if Rt ) R, and
none if Rt < R.
The firm cannot buy more labour than L!. Therefore we know:
t1 t (40)
The firm's problem now is to maximize (37) given the reputation
huiiding process and the labour supply constraint. Let A.t be the
Lagrangian multipliers associated with (40). For the time being
we will assume that the first-order conditions describe an in-
terior optimum. Two first-order conditions, with respect to
employment and wage in period t, will be:
6t-l (~_ ) - A.t = Oe r, wtt
6t-l (-L ) + A. t+l y' = Ot
Note from (41) that if (40)
have that of We willBL = Wt't
(41)
(42)
is not binding (A.t = O), we will
argue below that this is not incen-
tive compatible. Hence, A. > O.
We now solve (41) for A.t+l and substitute into (42). This
yields:
L =6(of w)y'.t oLt+1 - t+l
(43)
As long as the technology, the discount factor and y remain
unchanged over time, the problem is symmetric over time periods
(It is perhaps especially taxing to assume that y is constant
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across periods.). Therefore, Lt = L Itt and wt = w Itt. We can
now rewrite (43) as:
ofoL - w = (44)
One immediate consequence is that in equilibrium we must have
that
of
oL > w (45)
The firm must earn positive profit from the marginal worker.
This is a rather intuitive proposition. Condition (43) says that
in equilibrium the short run gain from lowering wages in one
period must be offset exactly by the loss in the next period due
to problems of recruiting workers. But had we been in a Wa1ras-
. .1.bri hof h f i 1d f .1an equ1 1 r1um were oL = ~, t e 1rm wou earn zero pro 1t
from the marginal worker. The possibility of a marginal reduc-
tion of the workforce could therefore not discipline the firm
from lowering wages. In a reputationa1 equi1ihrium we must have
that the firm earns positive profit from the marginal worker.
This implies that (40) must be binding, and At > o.
Does this mean that the firms earn positive profits in equilib-
rium? If that is the case, we should experience infinite entry
of new firms into this industry. In our setting profits cannot
be competed away by raising wages relative to labour's value
marginal product. This would simply not be incentive compatible.
Therefore profits must be dissipated by driving the nonrecover-
able investments, I, to a higher level than would have been
chosen in a setting where enforceable contracts could have been
entered. Therefore this model does not entail positive profits
in a true sense, but "appropriable quasirents", to use a concept
introduced by Klein, Crawford and A1chian (1978). Klein and
Leffler (lq81) picture these nonrecoverable investments as in-
vestments in advertising or other sales expenses. As an a1t~rna-
tive, Shapiro (1983) has suggested that these investments could
be investments in building up a reputation: In his model a high
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quality producer initially must sell high quality goods at the
low quality price in order to gain recognition.
It seems to be a tacit assumption in the literature that the
size of these investments has a neutral effect on the firm's
labour employment decision. That being the case, it can be seen
directly from (45) that our reputational model implies lower
employent than in a model with complete contracts.
So far we have assumed that the first-order conditions of the
problem describe an interior optimum. This is not necessarily
the case. E.g., there seems to be no natural assumption to im-
pose on y which ensures that the maximand is concave. Hore im-
portant economically: It might be that in some industries the
firm's possibilities of short-run gains by exploiting workers'
immobility were so large that no equilibrium with positive em-
ployment did exist.
Note that we here have used a framework with non-unionized work-
ers. The ensuing reputational equilibrium does not entail con-
tracts in a proper sense. The workers do not think of themselves
as having entered an implicit contract with the firm, they just
have adaptive expectations, and thereby a low-wage firm will be
punished subsequently by an outflow of workers. To me, this is
an attractive side of the model. One objection against much
contract theory is that workers do not seem to be aware that
they have entered an elaborate implicit contract with their
firm. Such a criticism is not valid against a model of the
present type. But admittedly, others might have preferred to
analyze a situation where the employer and the workers (perhaps
represented by a union) rationally played a game against each
other, or struck a bargain, or "contract", in a more proper
sense.
The main insight of this model is perhaps that a Walrasian equi-
librium has no disciplinig power. The threat of terminating a
business relationship is an empty one when the parties earn zero
profit/utility from a marginal relationship. This simple and
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intuitive idea underlies many recent articles. In a labour
market context it is interesting to point to Shapiro and
Stiglitz' (1984) version of the efficiency wage model, namely
the so- called "shirking model". In this model it is the reverse
need for disciplining which is investigated, i.e., the employ-
er's need to ensure that the workers perform. Because of a
transaction cost (costly monitoring), the firm must resort to
the threat of terminating the employment relationship with
workers caught shirking. As this threat would be empty in a
Walrasian equilibrium, it turns out that the need for discipline
leans to an equilibrium with unemployment.
Reliance and Damage Measures
The reputational model above was very extreme in that it assumed
that transaction costs blocked any opportunity for writing con-
tracts. The literature on damage measures takes a perhaps more
sober approach: It is possible to write enforceable contracts,
but it is not possible to make them contingent on which uncer-
tain state of the world which eventually materializes.
Key articles in this literature are Shavell (1980, 1984) and
Rogerson (1984). Neither of these articles is specially tailored
to a labour market setting. I have here chosen to present a
simple model due to Shavell (1984), and to discuss the relevance
for the labour market below.
We study the interaction of two risk-neutral, wealth maximizing
parties, a buyer and a seller. ~e buyer must undertake a sunk,
relationship-specific investment before he finds out whether or
not the seller will perform. In this literature, this investment
is called "reliance expenditures", or simply "reliance". After
the buyer has undertaken this investment, the seller observes
the outcome of an uncertain contingency. E.g., if we study a
production contract, he will learn his true production cost, c.
Ex ante c is'known only up to a probability distribution. If the
seller then performs, the buyer enjoys a henefit which Shavell
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calls the "expectancy", denotec'iv. Let us further denote B as
the set of contingencies under which the seller will not per-
form "the breach set", and k as the contract price.
It is now easy to show, and rather intuitive, that a Pareto
efficient contract will entail that the seller will not perform
when production cost exceeds the buyer's expectancy, i.e., B* =
{c I c > v} .
Shavell now assumes that due to transaction costs the seller and
the buyer can only enter noncontingent contracts. However, they
can also agree in advance that the seller shall pay a damage
measure to the buyer in case the seller does not perform.
Shavell then goes on to discuss the size of the breach set under
some commonly used damage measures relative to that under Pareto
efficient contracts.
First of all he discusses specific performance, which means that
the seller is never allowerl not to fulfill the contract. The
breach set is empty, and therefore obviously too small relative
to the Pareto efficient one. Against this, he discusses three
different damage measures, the restitution measure, the reliance
measure, and the expectation measure.
Under the restitution measure, a nonperforming seller must re-
turn the payment k. His breach set becomes B* = {clc > k}. Under
the reliance measure, the seller must return payment k and com-
pensate the reliance expenditure r (assumed to be measurable and
verifiable). The breach set becomes B* = {clc > r+k] , Under the
expectation measure, the seller must pay a court's estimate of
the buyer's expectancy v. Let us denote this estimate u. The
breach set becomes B* {clc > u}.
Shavell now assumes that u always is larger than r + k, which
seems a natural assumption. We then have: u > r + k > k > o.
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We then have that the breach set under the expectation measure
is smaller than that under the reliance measure, which again is
smaller than that under the restitution measure.
Our first observation is that if u is a close estimate of v, the
expectancy measure will take us very close to a Pareto efficient
situation. Second, note that if u underestimates vall three
damage measures will yield too large breach sets, but the expec-
tancy measure is closest to the optimal. Whether we would want
to use this measure or specific performance, depends on the
relative costs of having a too small or a too large breach set.
On the other hand, if u overestimates v, the expectancy measure
will lead to a too small breach set, but not so small as that
under specific performance. Which is better of the expectancy
measure and the reliance measure in this case, again depends on
the relative costs of too small and too large breach sets.
We have seen that when only noncontingent contracts can be
entered, this can to some extent be remedied by the use of dam-
age measures. In some types of contracts the use of damage mea-
sures seems widespread. But is this a relevant insight concern-
ing the workings of the labour market? I believe so, even though
the situation in the labour market seems more complicated than
Shavell's work indicates. A common arrangement in the labour
market is to enter a noncontingent contract, but to leave both
parties the option of terminating the relationship. In order to
induce correct investments in relation-specific capital, the
terminating party must pay a "termination penalty", or "damage
measure". This can take the form of a direct payment of money,
as when a firm pays a fired manager a "golden handshake", or
more indirect forms, as when a quitting worker forfeits seniori-
ty wage rises or promotion possibilities. One complication is
that in the labour market it is not always easy to ascertain
which party really initiated the termination. I will not go into
details on this question, only refer to the literature on in-
vestments in firm-specific human capital, which deals precisely
with questions like these, notably Hashimoto (1981), Hashimoto
and Yu (1980) and Carmichael (1984). As an aside: I find it
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rather peculiar how few cross-references there are between the
human capital literature and the labour contract literature,
considering that much the same questions are studied.
5. A Concluding Remark.
I have here tried to survey some of the very numerous contribu-
tions to labour contract theory. As I pointed out at the outset
of this survey, "labour contract theory" seems to become more
and more synonymous with "labour economics". All the same, I
think we can group the reviewed literature in two categories: In
some contributions it is the desire for risk-shifting which
motivates long-term contracts, in others it is the desire to
protect investments in relation-specific capital. Especially the
risk-shifting version of the theory now seems to be reasonably
well understood. However, I believe that many interesting
questions in contract theory still remain unanswered.
Especially, I think it would be interesting to bring these two
major strands of contract theory closer together. E.g., what is
the scope for risk-shifting be tween employer and employee within
the rather complex institutional set-up predicted by some of the
literature on investments in relation-specific human capital?
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LABOUR CONTRACT THEORY AND THE INSIDER-OUTSIDER DILEMMA
ABSTRACT
This paper brings together some central elements both of labour
contract theory and so-called insider-outsider theory. We study
labour contracts with two generations of workers where there is
a ban on differentiating wages between otherwise homogenous
workers of different seniority. Two basic results emerge: First,
there might be a region where wages fall as the state improves.
Crudely put, this originates from the old workers being reluc-
tant to share with newentrants the insurance indemnities which
in some states constitute a part of the wage. Moreover, even if
we assume the old workers to be ex post immohile (as in the
original implicit labour contract theory), we get a contract
structure of the same form as if we had assumed them to be ex
post mobile. Again crudely put: Newentrants are by necessity ex
post mobile. If we tie the wages of old and new workers to each
other, we will then, when any newentrants are hired, get a
situation as if all workers were mobile. Hy conclusion is that
within this framework the scope for the firm acting as an
insurer of labour income is much narrower than in standard con-
tract theory.
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LABOUR CONTRACT THEORY AND THE INSIDER-OUTSIDER DILEMMA
l. Introduction.
This paper attempts to bring together some of the central ele-
ments from standard implicit contract theory and so-called in-
sider-outsider theoryl).
Early work in what rather misleadingly is called "implicit" con-
tract theory2), as e.g. Azariadis (1975) and Baily (1974),
focuses on how the firm can play a role as an insurer against
variations in the workers' labour income. The basic premise is
that the firm can overcome the moral hazard problems which pre-
vent the workers from buying such insurance from an ordinary
insurance company.
This line of work has not very much to say about the relation-
ship between different vintages of workers. Among the classical
papers in the tradition only Holmstrom (1983) allows for more
than one vintage of workers. However, in Holmstrom's model there
are no limits to differentiating wages between different worker
vintages. This is in contrast with the standard assumptions in
insider-outsider theory. Also, Tracy and Woglom (1984) study
unionized contracts with more than one vintage of workers. But
again there is no limit to differentiating wages according to
seniority.
Let us now turn to the insider-outsider literature. Here the
focus is on the possible conflict of interest between old, sea-
soned workers and newentrants to the labour market. This in
contrast to the main body of labour economics, which takes the
conflict between the firm and its workers as the central clash
of interest. Several pioneering articles in this field have been
written by Assar Lindbeck and Dennis Snower (hereafter sometimes
denoted LS). (LS (1984 a and b), (1985 a, b), (1986).) Other
relevant work include Shaked and Sutton (1984), Oswald (1984),
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Tracy and Woglom (1984), Sampson (1985), Solow (1985), Carruth
and Oswald (1987), and Blanchard and Summers (1987). Also, the
relationship between the original workers of a labour-managed
enterprise and possible new hands might be seen as an example of
an insider-outsider dilemma. (See Ireland and Law (1982) and the
references therein).
The Lindbeck-Snower story has the following main building
blocks: The old, seasoned workers have some "edge" over possible
new entrants, due to some kind of labour turnover costs. These
costs could e.g. be firing/hiring/training costs (LS (1984a»,
costs connected with high labour turnover affecting insider mor-
ale negatively (LS (1984b», or that the insiders can withdraw
cooperation from or directly harass new workers who replace old
ones (LS (1985a». The old workers are capable of extracting at
least some of the rent arising from this bilateral monopoly
situation between the firm and old workers. In addition, there
are strict limits to wage discrimination against new workers.
Lindbeck and Snower's particular argument here is that after a
short period the newentrants cannot be distinguished from the
insiders. Further, the entrants cannot sign credible long-term
contracts where they promise to work permanently for less than
the insiders. That is, the entrants cannot restrain themselves
in advance from using the bargaining power they will get as soon
as they themselves become seasoned workers. Note that even if
the Lindbeck-Snower story explicitly rules out long-term con-
tracts, this is not an essential assumption per se, but only a
link in establishing limits to seniority wage differentiation.
The stated assumptions lead to a situation where the old workers
use their bargaining power to push up wages, and as wage dis-
crimination against newentrants is possible only to a very
limited extent, these high wages lead to involuntary unemploy-
ment among new workers.
As contract theory is weak on the relationship between insiders
and outsiders, the insider-outsider theory is mute about the
possible insurance elements in a contract between the firm and
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the old workers. It should therefore be some scope for merging
these two bodies of literature.
Crudely put, the main argument of this paper is the following:
In contract theory of the Azariadis-Baily type, wages are not
only payment for work done, but includes an insurance premium or
indemnity. When the wage for new workers is tied to that for old
workers, this might distort the old workers' possibility to buy
insurance from their employer. Exactly how this happens depends
on the particular assumptions made.
As there is a wide variety of labour contract models, and also
several versions of the insider-outsider theory, it is not
immediately clear how these theories should best be merged. I
have chosen to develop two versions of my model. The two
versions differ in that in the first model senior workers are
assumed to be ex post mobile, whereas they in the second are ex
post immobile. This turns out to be an interesting distinction.
2. A Modified Holmstrom Model
I will here present a model which follows the framework of Holm-
strom (1983) rather closely, with the main exception that there
is a ban on seniority wage differentiation.
The model is a two period one, and production takes place in
both periods.
The firm's goal is to maximize profit, expressed as
v = e o
s +
f (1 ) - w 1 + L l {e f(61 +1 )o o o s= sos
- w (61s o (l )
Here,
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v = expected profit (the firm is risk neutral)
a known productivity parameter in period I
the production function, we assume fl > O, fli < O.
the number of workers employed in period 1 (all workers
work an institutionally fixed workday)
the productivity parameter in period 2, given state s
(There are S mutually exclusive states of the world
which can occur in period 2, numbered such that
01 < 02 < ••• < Os)
(1-6) = the percentage of first period workers who, for exogen-
ous reasons, quit between periods 1 and 2. Every worker
has the same probability of being one of those who
° =o
f =
.R. =o
° =s
+
.R.s =
w =o
w =s
Q>s =
quit.
the number of new workers hired in state s
the wage in period 1
the wage in period 2, given state s, to both old,
retained workers and to new ones
the probability of state s occuring
Note that vie assume that the firm I s discount factor is 1. We
will also assume that this is the workers' discount factor.
I restrict attention to those states where at least one new
worker is hired, ~: > O. The new insights of this paper are only
relevant in these states, so I have chosen this assumption to
simplify the exposition. Moreover, this might even be a
realistic assumption if (1-6) is relatively large. Below, I will
make some informal remarks about what can be expected to happen
in deep slumps, when no new hirings are made. Further, I assume
that old workers never are fired to be replaced by new ones.
This seems reasonable, as long as we have specified that old and
new workers receive the same wage. (This assumption about equal
wages is this paperls most important assumption, and I will
defend it in the concluding remarks.) Then it only takes the
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slightest turnover cost to make the firm prefer seasoned workers
to new entrants.
To attract workers in the first period the firm must offer an
expected utility level at least equal to that which can be ob-
tained elsewhere, U:
U = u(wo) + 6 ~S l u(w ) $ + (1-6) x ) Us= S s (2)
U = a representative worker's expected utility
u = ex post worker utility (u' > O, u" < O, implying risk
aversion)
x = the utility of a worker who has quit for exogenous reasons
Condition (2) contains the presuppositions that workers and firm
have symmetric information as regards the state of the world,
that there can be established a money measure of the various
benefits and costs accruing to unemployed workers, and that all
workers have the same probability of quitting for exogenous
reasons between periods.
Like Holmstrom, I will assume that firms are able to enter into
enforceable contracts. Workers, however, are ex post mobile and
cannot commit themselves not to leave the firm in period 2. We
must therefore have:
u(w) ) u(R)s s ~ s ( 3 )
R = benefits accruing to workers not employed in the firm ins
question, measured in money terms. This can e.g. both he
unemployed benefits or moneyearned in a spot market for
labour.
We assume that there are no necessary connection between Rands
x. Condition (3) also ensures that the firm will be able to
attract as many new workers as it wants in period 2. (Both old
and new workers have outside opportunities R .)s
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Above we argued that the slightest turnover costs would make the
firm prefer seasoned workers to newentrants when all workers
must be paid the same wage. But the possibility remains that the
firm can achieve a cut in wage costs by replacing ~ old work-
ers by new ones. (With the recent incidents at the Murdoch
papers in mind, this cannot altogether be dismissed as unreal-
istic). However, I will block this possibility by assuming that
no firm can be founded in period 2 only with new workers. This
could be because there is a shortage of entrepeneurial talent,
capital goods etc. in the relevant run. In the very long run
this is clearly an unsatisfactory assumption. However, there
could - also in the long run - be a social convention forbidding
a firm with only new workers to pay a different wage than that
paid by a firm with both old and new workers~ but this is specu-
lative. If old and new workers could be segregated in different
firms, this would mean that a ban on seniority wage differenti-
ation to some extent could be evaded.
First-order Conditions
The firm's problem now is to maximize (l) subject to (2) and
(3). We assume that" and U are twice differentiable and
strictly concave. We let A denote the Lagrangian multiplier
associated with (2), and define ~ - o~ + ~+. The first-ordersos
conditions are:
(4 )
-~ + A u' (w ) = Oo o ( 5 )
e f' (~ ) - w = Os s s t;J s (6 )
w = maxs
where W*s
+-(o~ +~ )o s
[w*,R] t;Jss s
is the solution to
+ AOU'(w*) = Os t;Js (7)
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Interpretation
Our main interest will lie with condition (7), characterizing
the wage policy in period 2, as this is the main departure from
standard contract theory. This being so, I will start out by
briefly commenting on what standard contract theory predicts as
regards wage setting.
In the original implicit labour contract literature (the Azaria-
dis-Baily model) it was optimal that workers received a constant
wage across states of the world. But such a wage scheme would
have to imply that the wage in some states would be lower than
the workers' reservation wage. If the workers are ex post mobile
and cannot commit themselves to stay on with the firm even when
w < R , this wage scheme would not be incentive compatible.s s
If we assume that senior workers are ex post mobile, but allow
the firm to pay a wage w+ to newentrants which does not necess-s
arily coincide with that of the older workers, we have a set-up
rather similar to that in Holmstrom (1983). Within such a
framework newcomers would be paid w+ = R , and the first-orders s
condition (7) would be replaced by
w = max [w, R ]sos Il s (8 )
In states where R is low, workers will receive a flat wage w .s o
In states with a high R , workers must be paid a wage equal tos
the reservation wage, to prevent them from deflicting from the
firm. Holmstrom speaks of this as wages being "downward sticky
and upward mobile". This might be a somewhat unfortunate usage
of terms: In a multiperiod model, whether wages are sticky or
mobile over time depends on how the state in one period compares
with the state in the preceding period. If a good state is
followed by yet another good state, wages might be both upward
and downward flexible. If a bad state is followed by another bad
state, wages might be upward and downward immobile. Therefore, I
prefer to speak of such a wage scheme as a "safety net" insur-
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ance arrangement. Moreover, as the wage in Holmstrom's model
never can be lower than R , this insurance arrangement must bes
paid for by the workers accepting a lower wage in the first
period than they would otherwise have done.
In our setting, however, where senior workers are ex post mobile
and seniority wage differentiation is not allowed, the period 2
wage scheme is characterized by (7). Let us first approach this
issue intuitively.
Now, the firm knows on the one hand that the cheapest way to buy
labour from old workers is to offer these workers insurance
against wage fluctuations. On the other hand, the new workers
are uninsurable - as they arrive at the scene after the true
state of nature is known. This means that the cheapest way of
buying labour from this group is to pay them exactly their
reservation wage. When wage differentiation is not possible,
these two considerations cannot be reconciled. A balance must be
struck hetween them.
Alternatively, it might be instructive to see things from the
old workers' viewpoint. If these old workers buy insurance from
their firm, their wage will in some states supercede their res-
ervation wage by an "implicit insurance indemnity". But when
there is no wage differentiation between old and new workers,
also new workers must receive this insurance indemnity. But the
newentrants cannot participate in paying for the insurance
arrangement, simply because they are not present in the first
period. This cools the old workers' desire to buy insurance.
Let us now turn to investigate to what extent these intuitive
arguments are supported by the first-order conditions of the
problem. Substituting (5) into (7) and rearranging, we obtain:
u' (\<1* )s =u' (w )
o
61 +.R. +o s
6.R.o
(8)
Remember that \<1* is the wage that wiil be paid as long as thes
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restriction
+w .. w •s o
complete insurance of the workers' wages,
Ws ) R does not bind. We see that as 1+ ..O,s s
If no new workers had been hired, we would have had a
as long as the
Holmstrom's result. When
1+ increases, '111* will bes s
that the larger the number of remaining old workers and the more
risk averse they are, the less w+ will be falling in 1+. Froms s
the discussion above these results seem rather intuitive.
restriction (3) does not block this. This corresponds to
+1 > O, we have that '111* < w . And ass s o
decreasing. It also follows immediately
But condition (8) is not satisfactory as the end result of our
analysis. First, (8) only relates one endogenous variable to
another. Second, we are primarily interested in studying w , thes
wage actually paid in a state, not in '111*, what the wage woulds
have been if (3) is not binding.
We now proceed to study how the optimal contract prescribes
different values of wand 1 for different ex post realizationss s
of s. I will start out with the assuMPtion that 0 /R and Rare. - s s s
increasing in s. This means that as a state improves both "in-
side" productivity 0 and "outside" productivity R increases,s s
but 0 increases relatively more. This is restrictive, and wills
be relaxed below.
*We will look at two cases, in the first w ~ R ,
* s sw > R . Conditions (6) and (7) describe optimals s
given ex post realization of s. In case l,
in the second
1 and w for as s
(6) and (7) can be
written as:
f' (1 )s
Rs= es rj s (9)
w = Rs s rj s (10)
As both 0 /R and R increase in s, it follows immediately thats s s
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both w and ~ are increasing in s.
s s
Now look to the somewhat more difficult case 2. In this case,
(6) and (7) can be stated as:
f1 s (11)
*-~ + AO u' (w ) = Os s f1 s (12)
Totally differentiating, we obtain:
*o~ 00 ow
Gs f"(~ )__s ds + f'(~ )__ s ds - ~ss ds = Os os s os v (13)
*o~ * owss ds + A o U Il (w ) ds = Oas- s ~ (14)
Note that A = ~ /u'(w ) here is a constant, as w and ~ ofo o o o
course cannot be influenced by which state of the world occurs
ex post.
Rearranging (14) we get:
*ow s
os = (15)
Substitution into (13) yields:
oG
_ f' (~ )_s
sos (16 )=
s
fli (~ ) _
s *AOU"(W )s
o
We see that if we assume that
*ow o~
o fli (~ ) _ s/ s < O
s s l5"S as (17)
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*<H s oWsthen ~ > O and as- < O.
Now, remember that we have assumed that the problem is "well
behaved", in that the first-order conditions really do describe
a unique and interior global optimum. Let us assume that we are
*in such an optimum. If we change ~ and w from these optimals s
values, and still abide by the contract (represented by the
first-order conditions), this should not be profitable. But
increasing ~s in such a way both brings about a fall in marginal
productivity and in wages. In order for this move not to be
profitable, the first effect must dominate the latter. This
implies that if the problem is well behaved in the sense
described, (17) must hold.
But still, (17) is restrictive. If for instance both the f and u
functions are comparatively flat, the sign in (17) would be
reversed. This would be the case when a new worker would not be
very much less productive than the older ones, and that the
workers are not very risk averse. It might then be that it would
always be optimal, if new workers are taken on at all, not to
include any insurance in the wage at all, and to take on many
enough workers to equate marginal productivity e f'(~ ) ands s
outside opportunity R . However, in my formal analysis I haves
chosen to focus on the case where the problem is "well
behaved" .
Let us now bring together the two cases. A diagram of optimal
wage setting policy might look as follows:
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s
*s
Fig. l.
The thickly drawn line represents optimal w across different ex. s
post realizations of s. s* denotes the state where (3) starts to
bind.
To the left of s*, the wage contains an implicit insurance in-
demnity, in that w > R . We see that this indemnity becomess s
smaller, and that w is falling in s.s From s* onwards w = R ,s s
meaning that no insurance indemnity at all is included in the
wage.
The novelty of this wage scheme compared to that found in the
Rolmstrom paper, is that when w ~ R does not bind, wages wills s
be falling when the state improves.
We have assumed that states are numbered such that 0 JR iss s
increasing in s. But then there is no reason to expect that the
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absolute level of R to be increasing in s. In the more generals
case where no restrictions are placed on R , the optimal wages
policy might look something like this:
w
s
s
Fig. 2.
Again, the thickly drawn line represents optimal wage policy
*w = max [w ,R ].s s s
A few words might be in order on what can be expected to happen
in deep slumps, when no new workers are being hired: With no new
workers distorting the old workers' possibility to buy insurance
from their employer, the result will be a constant wage across
these very bad states. Employment will be efficient/inefficient-
ly high, depending on whether or not private unemployment in-
surance is allowed. These results are standard in labour con-
tract theory.
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Now we will turn to the case where the old workers are ex post
immobile. It proves that in this case a ban on seniority wage
differentiation have an even more limiting effect on a firm's
possibility to act as an insurer of its enployees' wage income.
3. Ex Post Immobile Workers.
Are workers best modelled as being ex post mobile or immobile?
Presumably the truth lies somewhere in between. I believe, as
Holmstrom, that bans on involuntary servitude block the possi-
bility for workers to enter into contracts which specify that
they shall remain in a firm, even when it is not in their best
interest to do so. But on the other hand, this does not mean
that workers ex post can move at no cost to another firm, as
there are various kinds of mobility costs. HodeIling workers
either as being totally mobile or totally immobile are two
extreme cases, and I think it might be fruitful to investigate
both of them.
In the previous model condition (3) demanded that u(w ) ) ueR )s s
if the firm should be able to attract new workers and keep its
old ones.
Now, if the firm shall be able to attract new workers we must
have that
(w -R ).t+ ;> Os s s for .t: ) O ti s (18)
. +
As we have restricted attention to the states where.t > O,s
condition (18) is equivalent with (3). This means that the model
with the old workers being ex post immobile is identical to the
one with mobile old workers. Hence, the solution to the firm's
problem, including the optimal second period wage policy, is the
same. In other words: With a ban on seniority wage differen-
tiation, the wage scheme will be of the "safety net insurance"
type, even when old workers are ex post immobile.
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I consider this as the present paper's most interesting result.
Usually in labour contract theory, the more immobile workers are
after having entered a firm, the larger the scope for writing
incentive compatible contracts. Here we see that even when the
old workers are completely immohile, the limitation on which
contracts can be entered, is exactly the same as with ex post
mobile workers. The intuition is straightforward. Even if old
workers are immobile, the younger ones are not. In states where
alternative opportunities are good, the firm pays a wage equall-
ing R in order to attract new entrants. But due to the ban ons
seniority wage discrimination, also old workers must receive
this wage. We are therefore in a situation as if all workers
were mobile, even though this only applies for the newentrants.
In turn, this implies that within our framework the scope for
the firm acting as an insurer of its workers' labour income is
much narrower than in standard contract theory.
Note that there is one slight difference between the model with
ex post mobile old workers and that with immohile ones. Re-
stricting attention to the states where ~+ > O does not mean thes
same in the two instances. With ex post mobile older workers,
(3) binds always. With ex post immobile older workers, (3) binds
only when new workers are actually being hired. This means that
in the latter case the firm will hesitate more (meaning that the
state must be better) before it takes on the first new workers.
4. Seniority Wage Differentiation.
The major assumption both in this paper and in the insider-
outsider literature is that both incumbent workers and new en-
trants are paid the same wage. I will here discuss this assump-
tion.
There is no denial that in real life we do observe seniority
wage differentials. However, to me it seems that there are
limits to such differentiation, although these limits perhaps
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are narrower in Europe than in the U. S. (where the practice of
so-called "two-tier contracts" seems to have spread recently).
For some casual empiricism and further discussion of this point,
see Dreze (1986).
Of course, this question is hard to settle by casual empiricism.
But at least in my own country Norway, seniority wage differ-
entiation seems to be rather small, and apparently not state-
contingent. Note that unli.mited seniority wage differentiation,
as assumed in Holmstrom's model, not only requires that old and
new workers can be paid differently, but that this difference
can be made to vary across states of the world. (A word of
caution: F.ven if there seems to be small seniority wage differ-
entials between workers holding the same kind of job, promotion
to better paid jobs could be based on seniority rather than
ability. But also this is a rather imperfect way of differenti-
ating wages between worker vintages.)
What can be the reason for these limits to seniority wage diff-
erentiation? It could be because of social conventions, people's
ideas of justice etc. Alternatively, the reason might be that
informational problems anC! transaction costs limit the possi-
bilities of writing enforceable contracts. E.g. if the firm
could circumvent the ban on replacing an old worker with a new
one - it might be difficult to verify whether a worker is fired
for shirking or for some other reason, then it might he in the
interest of the old workers to demand that the new workers be
paid the same wage as themselves.
My approach has been - in line with the insider-outsider litera-
ture - simply to assume that there are E£ possibilities to diff-
erentiate wages between generations of workers, but of course
knowing that we then study a polar case.
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5. Concluding Remarks.
In this paper we have investigated optimal labour contracts
between firm and workers when there are two generations of work-
ers and a ban on seniority wage differentiation. We found that
this did not only lead to involuntary unemployment among young
workers, as is the traditional message of insider-outsider lit-
erature, but the possibility of older workers being ahle to buy
insurance from their employer against income fluctuations might
also be distorted.
Two main results emerged. First, there might be regions where
the wage falls as the state improves. The old workers will be
reluctant to let their wage in a state include an insurance
indemnity when they have to share this benefit with new workers.
When an improved state implies more new workers, this might lead
to a falling wage.
Second, we find that the scope for including insurance elements
in the workers' wage is as narrowwhen the old workers are ex
post immobile, as if they had been ex post mobile. Even when the
old workers are immobile, the younger ones are not. Therefore,
in a good state a wage equalling outside opportunities must be
paid to attract newentrants - and due to the ban on seniority
wage discrimination, also old workers must receive this wage.
When new workers are hired, we are therefore in a situation as
if all workers were mobile. In turn, the insurance arrangement
between the old workers and the firm will therefore have the
same form as if the old workers were ex post mobile, even though
they are not. We get what I here have denoted a "safety net"
insurance arrangement. This means that the scope for the firm
acting as an insurer of its workers' labour income is con-
siderably narrower than in standard contract theory.
Especially the first of these results, namely that wages fall as
the state gets better, seems unrealistic. This might mean that
the basic premise of this paper, that there are limits to seni-
ority wage differentiation, is not a good assumption. Rut it
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could also imply that some of the assumptions that this paper
shares with the whole body of contract theory are inappropriate.
I believe that contract theory often predicts too complex con-
tracts compared with the real world. It is my opinion that prob-
lem solving costs are not dealt with properly in contract theo-
ry, and re1ated1y, that we do not understand well enough issues
as commitment and renegotiation. (For some work along these
lines, see Hart and Moore (1985) and Oswald (1985).) Perhaps
these shortcomings have been clouded by early implicit contract
theory predicting rather simple contracts with a constant wage
across states. Here we see that rather small changes of assump-
tions from these early labour contract models bring about a much
more complex contract structure. One possible interpretation of
the present analysis is therefore that it highlights some short-
comings of the original labour contract literature. However, if
labour contract theory were brought closer to reality when it
comes to problem solving costs, commitment, renegotiation etc.,
I would still expect the clash of interest betw.een different
worker vintages to influence the structure of contracts. Exactly
how is of course difficult to tell.
By way of conclusion I would like to point out the significance
of one still uncommented, major assumption, namely that there
are only two periods and two generations. This specification
seems appropriate when the risk facing the firm is a major,
one-shot risk (will the new production technique work, will the
new product find a market?). If we are studying recurring risks
(will productivity or product price go up or down this year?), a
multi-period model with overlapping generations of workers would
seem a more natural framework. In such models a given generation
would not only have conflicting interests with the generation
less senior to it, but perhaps also with the even more senior
generation. In the context of our two models: f-lerethe "old"
generation wants to post a bond in the first period (implicitly,
by accepting lower wages). This, however, might collide with the
"even older" generation's preferred wage profile in this period.
A closer study of such overlapping generations models I believe
is an interesting topic for future research. However, one objec-
tion against such overlapping generations models would be that
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our assumption that it is not possible to form a firm only with
new workers seems very taxing in this long run.
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Notes
1) It has been pointed out to me (by Andrew Oswald and John
Moore) that Black and Bulkley (1985) deal with some of the
same issues as here. There are substantial differences be-
tween the papers~ but my result (to be presented) that wages
might be falling as the state gets better has a.close rela-
tive in Black and Bulkley's paper. Perhaps the most important
difference between Black and Bulkley's paper and my own is
that they employ a single period model, whereas I use a two
period one. As the reader will discover, prepayment of insur-
ance will here play an essential role in the optimal con-
tract, even when the old workers are ex post immobile. This
is not captured in a one period setting. Also, a recently
published article by Horn and Svensson (1986) deals with the
integration of contract theory and trade union theory, with
emphasis on risk-shifting. However, this article does not
focus on the insider- outsider dilemma.
2) The term "implicit" is not clearly defined in this work, and
seems to mean only "unwritten". Recently it has become common
to think of an implicit contract as one which cannot be en-
forced by a third party. In contrast, in early "implicit"
labour contract theory contracts are assumed to be fully en-
forceable.
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*WORKSHARING VERSUS LAYOFFS IN LABOR CONTRACTS
ABSTRACT
Labor contract theory, like much other work in labor economics,
focuses often only on the determination of the employment level.
Whether worksharing or layoffs are used to effectuate fluctua-
tion in employment, is a question mostly left unanswered. Excep-
tions are for instance Mortensen (1978) and Rosen (1985), who
point out that indivisibilities of some sort are necessary for
layoffs to be strictly preferred. This paper examines the impli-
cation of one such indivisibility: it is not possihle to have
more than one job at the same time. If we assume that the mone-
tary value of leisure shows positive but diminishing marginal
returns with respect to leisure, the following result can be
obtained: When the "net wage" in alternative employment is
below a certain value, worksharing will always be chosen. When
it is above another, higher critical value, layoffs will always
be chosen. Between these critical values it is possible that a
combination of both instruments will be used to effectuate a
given reduction of employment.
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1. Introduction.
It has been common practice in economic reasoning about labor
markets to focus on the determinants of the employment level,
and to leave aside the question of how unemployment is distribu-
ted among workers. This holds true also for standard contract
theory, as in the original treatments by Azariadis (1975), Baily
(1974) and Gordon (1974): A result from this theory is that a
firm might want to reduce its employment level in adverse states
of nature, even when the firm acts as an insurer of its workers.
However, labor contract theory by itself has little to say about
whether worksharing or layoffs will be used to bring about such
a reduction, i.e., whether a reduction in employment will be
distributed equally among all workers or carried only by some,
totally unemployed workers. Note however that this is a weakness
labor contract theory shares with much other labor market the-
ory. Within a contract framework Mortensen (1978) and Rosen
(1985) among others have pointed out that nonconvexities of some
sort - for instance in the production function or in the utility
function - are necessary for layoffs to be strictly preferred.
Here I present an example of a nonconvexity different from Mort-
ensen's examples: The key assumpion is that only totally unem-
ployed workers can find alternative employment in other indust-
ries, i.e., it is not possible to work in two firms at the same
time. I assume that the marginal monetary value of leisure is
positive but diminishing. Now the following result can be ob-
tained: I show that when the "net wage" in alternative employ-
ment is below a certain critical value, worksharing will always
be chosen. When it is above an other, higher critical value,
layoffs will always be chosen. In the mid-zone between these
critical values it is possible that a combination of both inst-
ruments will be used to effectuate a given reduction of employ-
ment l)
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section
2 I present the basic model framework, and also derive a com-
plete insurance result, quite similar to the insurance results
of standard contract theory. In section 3 I use this result to
reformulate the firm's optimization problem. Given that the firm
shall provide its workers full insurance against variations in
utility, and taking total employment level as given, what is the
optimal use of reduced hours and layoffs? Section 4 summarizes
the discussion in section 3. Section 5 contains some final re-
marks on some of the restrictive assumptions of the preceding
analysis.
2. Preliminaries.
Consider a firm that has a pool of N identical workers. These
workers are non-unionized. Production takes place in an uncer-
tain environment: In period one a contract between firm and
workers is entered, then in period two one of a finite set of
states of the world occurs. A state e is characterized by a
productivity coefficient se' which enters the production func-
tion in a multiplicatively separable way. ~he probability of a
state e occuring is 1te.
Each worker supplies inelastically one unit of labor. The con-
tract between the firm and the workers specifies we' be' ne and
Ne: we denotes the wage level in state e for retained workers,
be is a severance pay to laid-off workers, 2) ~ is the work
intensity of a retained worker (the fraction of his unit of
supplied labor actually purchased by the firm), and Ne is the
number of retained workers.
We assume that the firm maximizes expected profit, V. This im-
plies that the firm is risk-neutral.
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Note that for simplicity we have abstracted from discounting.
The expression sef(neNe) is a multiplicatively separable produc-
tion function, expressed in value terms. We assume fl>O and
f" <O.
We assume that the firm must offer each of the workers in its
pool at least a market determined expected utility level V :
u > U (2)
Workers are assumed to maximize expected utility. The ex post
utility function of a representative worker will be written as
u=u(M+r(J.»). (3)
u is ex post utility. M is money income, whereas r is the pecun-
iary value of leisure, J.. Leisure is a quantity between O and l,
denoting the fraction of a period which a worker does not work.
As is well known, it presupposes restrictive ass~mptions to
assign a pecuniary value to leisure3)4). We will assume that
marginal utility is positive but diminishing, implying risk
aversion.
I will also assume that ri>0 and ril <O, and that r(O) = O. I.e.,
the marginal money value of leisure is positive and diminishing.
I hold this to be a realistic assumption, but admittedly it is a
special case. Below it will turn out that the functional form of
r is crucial for the results.
The ex post utility of a worker retained in period 2 can now be
written:
for all e (4 )
A laid-off worker can choose between leisure or finding alterna-
tive employment according to what yields the highest utility. I
will here assume that a worker always works full time in the
alternative job, but this assumption can easily be relaxed. Let
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We denote the "net wage" in the alternative job. We might for
instance imagine that we represents the alternative wage less
mobility costs. We will further discuss the interpretation of we
towards the end of this paper. The ex post utility of a laid-off
worker can now be stated as:
for all e (5)
By using (4) and (5), we can now restate (2) as:
(6)
This formulation implies that workers are picked out to be laid
off in an arbitrary fashion.
When we solve the firm's optimization problem, it will be con-
venient to distinguish between two cases. We define:
A - we - r(l) (7)
Now, let case l be given by A < O. By inspection of (5) we see
that this implies that a laid-off worker will prefer leisure to
finding a new job. Case 2 is defined by A > O. In this case new
employment will be chosen.
The firm's maximization problem in the two cases, respectively,
will be to maximize (l) given (6), and subject to ne ~ I, N ~ N
and that the choice variahles be non-negative.
There are potential problems with applying standard techniques
here as neither ',1 nor U are necessarily concave. This is a
common problem to many labor contract models, but rarely of any
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real significance (see Holmstrom (lQA3), Appendix A). I will
here apply a step-wise solution procedure: First I assume that
93 and Ne are exogenous variables (:j: O), and find then that the
risk-neutral firm will provide its workers any quantity of fair
insurance. (This problem is well behaved.) Then, in Section 3, I
use this result to restate the firm's problem in a more "manage-
able" form.
As mentioned, let us for the time being consider ne and Ne as
exogenous variables. We will start off by considering case 1,
i.e., A < O. We denote by A the Lagrangian multiplier associated
with the constraint (6). Obviously, condition (6) will always
hold with equality. The first-order conditions with respect to
we and be will be:
for all e (8)
Ne
-1te(N-Ne) - A 1te( (1- _) u' (be+r(l») = O
N
for all e (9 )
As u is a strictly concave function of only one variable, we
know that equal marginal utilities imply equal utility levels.
In turn, equal utility levels imply equal money or money equi-
valent income. Considering this, conditions (8) and (9) imply:
for all e (10)
For case 2 a corresponding condition can be found:
for all e (l l )
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The state-independent constants K and L can be seen from (6) to
be equal, and given by:
u(K} = u(L} = u
Conditions (10) and (11) describe complete insurance in the
sense that a worker's ex post utility will be constant, indepen-
dent of the state of the world and of the values of ne and Ne'
As the complete insurance conditions are derived assuming ne and
Neto be exogenous, they hold for any ne and any Ne' In the re-
mainder of this paper, ~ and Ne will be considered to be choice
variables.
3. Worksharing versus Layoffs.
We are now ready to turn to our main issue: lfuen will it be
optimal to use workshari nq or alternatively layoffs in order to
obtain a desired reduction of the employment level?
I will now use the complete insurance result of section 2 to
reformulate the firm's optimization problem. To simplify, I will
take the desired total employment level in a state as given, and
only investigate how a cost minimizing firm will choose between
worksharing and layoffs to effectuate a given reduction in em-
ployment. (Naturally, if we compare the profit yielded by diff-
erent levels of total employment, given the complete insurance
condition and a cost minimizing choice between worksharing and
layoffs, the optimal total employment level can be found.)
Conditions (10) and (11) tell us that a worker will not care
about whether a reduction in employment is effectuated by the
use of worksharing or layoffs: He knows that his utility in one
basic time unit will be held constant anyway. He therefore lea-
ves this decision with the firm, as long as the complete insur-
ance condition is honored. Further, by summarizing conditions
(10) and (II) for all workers, we see that the firm's total
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outlay on wages and severance pay plus the value of spare time
to the workers shall equal a constant. (In this paper "spare
time" will mean the time a worker does not work in his primary
firm, whereas "leisure" denotes the time he does not work either
in the primary firm nor in any alternative job. The value of the
workers' spare time is therefore the monetary value of leisure
for the retained workers plus income net of mobility costs in
alternative employment for the laid-off workers.) Obviously,
when total labour costs plus the value of the workers' spare
time shall equal a constant, to maximize the value of spare time
implies to minimize labour costs. And as we have taken the total
employment level as given, minimization of labour costs imply
that profits are maximized. Hence, the firm's problem can be
stated as one of distributing a given amount of additional spare
time so as to maximize the value of this spare time.
The value of spare time can be expressed as:
(12)
where subscript i refers to an individual worker i. nei = ne for
retained workers, ne' = l for laid-off workers who choose to- l.
find a new job, and Q, = O for laid-off workers who choosetJl.
leisure rather than employment. Note that here we interpret we'- l.
as the wage actually (as opposed to potentially) earned in al-
ternative employment. That means that wei = O for all workers
but for those who have chosen ne' = l.- l.
We want to consider changes in ne and Ne which bring about an
equal reduction in employment from an arbitrary initial employ-
ment level ne~e. If we want to reduce employment by, say, dR,
using only dNe or dne as our policy variable, ".,emust have
(13 )for all e
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Now, the problem is so simplifieo that it can be solveo by a
rather intuitive approach. We simply compare the value of an
incremental increase in spare time if worksharing or a layoff is
used, from any given starting point. Finite changes in the em-
ployment level will be viewed as composed of many such incremen-
tal changes.
Let us start by considering case l, the case where the value of
alternative employment was so low that a laid-off worker would
choose to spend his spare time at leisure activities. Suppose
the firm wants to bring about a small reduction in the employ-
ment level. Considering (12) and (13), the relevant comparison
will be:
Bl - [r'(l-ne)·ne] - [r(l) - r(l-ne)] ~ O
for all e (14)
The first bracketed term is the value of extra spare time if
worksharing is chosen, whereas the second bracke~eo term repre-
sents the value of additional spare time in the case of a lay-
off. Ne have multiplied by ~ in the first term to make the em-
ployment reduction in the two cases equal, i.e., in order to
satisfy condition (13). Obviously Bl > O implies that worksha-
ring will be chosen, while Bl < O will lead to layoffs.
As r' > O and ril < O, we know:
r'(l-ne) >
l r I (.l) d.l = ~(r (l)-r (l-ne»
ne
-for any ne' for all e (15 )
From condition (15) we know that Bl always will be positive,
accordingly worksharing will always be chosen in case l. The
intuition is rather simple: With the present formulation all
workers have identical utility functions. Further, this common
utility function implies that the marginal monetary value of
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leisure decreases as one gets more leisure. In case 1 we know
that all spare time will be used on leisure activities. It is
then rather obvious that the value of a given spare time is
maximized if it is distributed equally among the workers, rather
than the unemployment being carried by only a few. Note that -
by the same line of reasoning as above - if r is linear, the
firm will be indifferent hetveen worksharing and layoffs, and
if r is strictly convex, layoffs will be the preferred choice.
We now turn to case 2, defined by A > o. This means a laid-off
worker will take up alternative employment. Once again, a cost
minimizing firm will choose to maximize the value of the wor-
kers' spare time, as that minimizes total labor costs. When a
small reduction in employment is warranted, the relevant compar-
ison is:
for all e (16)
The first bracketed term is, as before, the value of extra spare
time in the case of worksharing. ~e seconn bracketed term ex-
presses the value of additional spare time when a layoff is
used.
A priori we cannot tell which one of the bracketed terms in (16)
is the larger. If B2 > O for any ne worksharing will always be
chosen, if B2 < O for any ne layoffs will always be the prefer-
red instrument. But as both bracketed terms depend on ne' it
might be that B2 > O for some values of ne and B2 < O for other
values.
Let us differentiate B2 with respect to ne:
= - r' ,(1-ne )•ne + r' (1-ne )
for all e (l7 )
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This implies that if B2 has different sign for different values
of ne, it will be positive for high values of ne and negative
for low values. B2 will never switch sign more than once.
If a finite change in employment is desired, we can imagine that
this finite change is decomposed into a sum of incremental chan-
ges. For each incremental change the firm must use condition
(16) to determine whether worksharing or a layoff shall be used.
As B2 might change sign for different values of ne a finite
change of employment could be effectuated by the use of both
instruments. Say that we start from the full employment level,
and that we have the case where B2 changes sign. We then know
from (17) that a relatively small decrease in employment will be
brought ahout by worksharing, whereas for a relatively large
decrease in employment hoth instruments will be taken into use.
~he intuition is simple: At a high employment level the value of
leisure is high. It might then pay to choose worksharing in
order to give all workers a little more leisure, rather than
having one worker move to alternative employment. At lower em-
ployment levels the value of leisure is lower. Then it might be
that the wage net of mobility cost in alternative employment for
a laid- off worker is higher than the monetary value of a little
more leisure to all workers. Consequently, a layoff would be the
optimal choice. A finite reduction in employment might include
both of these situations: We should then observe both shorter
working time ~ layoffs simultaneously.
We have seen that in case 2 the firm will use layoffs to reduce
the employment level if the alternative employment opportunity
is of a "high enough" quality, i.e., when B2 < o. The idea is
roughly that a big chunk of spare time sometimes can be better
utilized than many small periods of time off. One of Mortensen's
(1978) examples of indivisibility leading to layoffs being cho-
sen, was when the workers' utility function was convex in leis-
ure. Then one long spell of leisure is more valuable than the
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same amount of leisure divided on many short spells. However, I
find it hard to believe that the frequent use of layoffs is due
to the workers having a preference for going on one long fishing
trip rather than many short 'one s , In the present framework we
have retained the idea that a long spell of spare time can be
more valuable than many short ones, but this is not due to the
utility function being convex in leisure, but rather that people
cannot work in two firms at the same time. When a totally unem-
ployed person can find new employment, whereas workers working
reduced hours must use their spare time on leisure activities,
this might be a rationale for the use of layoffs, provided that
the net wage in alternative employment is high enough.
4. Critical Values of the "Net Wage" in Alternative Employment.
Above we have studied case I and case 2 separately. Let us now
see these two cases in conjunction. Both the quantity A, which
delineates case l and case 2, and B2, which determines whether
worksharing or layoffs w i Ll, be used in case 2, depend on we. It
might be instructive to compare the values of we which make A
-*and B2 exactly equal zero, respectively. Let us denote by we the- -** -value of we which makes A equal zero, whereas we (ne) denotes
the value of we which makes B2 equal to zero for a given ne·-** -**Further, weL and weH denote the lowest and the highest value of...:It* _ _
we (~ ), respectively, when we allow ne to vary.
We have:
...:It
we = r(l) (18 )
-** - -we (ne) = r' (1-ne) • ~ + r(1-~ ) (19)
-**It is easy to show that we is increasing in ne. This implies
(O) -** -**= weL and we
-**weL = r(l)
Hence, we have
-* -** -**we = weL < weH
- 76 -
(l) -** -**= weH· From (19), we = r(l),(O)
(20)
(21)
Condition (21) can be viewed as summarizing the findings in
Sections 3 and 4:
-*we < we This is case l, in which work-
sharing will be chosen, since Bl
always is positive.
-* -** -**we = weL < we < weH : -*As we > we' '\'1e are in case 2,
i.e., a laid-off worker will
choose to find a new job. When we
lies in this area, layoffs can be
taken into use in combination
with worksharing to bring about
a reduction in employment. We
have seen above that this happens
when the desired employment re-
duction is relatively large. The
marginal value of leisure is
decreasing in leisure. When the
marginal value of leisure is low
enough relative to we' it will
pay to take layoffs into use. For
higher we 's, the size of a finite
reduction necessary for layoffs
to be taken into use, is re-
duced.
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Now the value of we has become so
large that any reduction in em-
ployment will be brought about by
layoffs.
We have said that we denotes "net wage" in al~ernative employ-
ment, i.e., the gross alternative wage, say, we' less mobility
costs, Ce. Let us now, rather tentatively, try to introduce
"duration" of a state in the analysis. Assume that a state e is
characterized not only by a productivity coefficient se' but
also by how many time units roe it lasts. In this case, if there
is some fixed cost element in the mobility cost, the per period
mobility cost will be a declining function of me. If all mobili-
ty costs were independent of the length of the state, we would
have:
w -e (22)
~ve see immediately that a high me increases we' as it in a sense
will undermine the importance of mobility costs. However, when
'"roe has reached a certain value, we will have we ~ we' and fur-
ther increases in mewill not influence we' and therefore not the
choice between worksharing and layoffs either.
I think that these last remarks are fairly obvious, but such
issues are rarely focused on, as duration of states, or more
generally, correlation of productivity coefficients across peri-
ods, never seems to have been modelled explicitly in a labor
contract frameworkS).
5. Final Remarks.
Here I will comment on some of the simplifying assumptions
underlying the present model.
NORGES 1·-IAND£=LSHØYSKOLl:.
BIBLIOTEKET
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One such restrictive assumption is that the choice between work-
sharing and layoffs can be made contingent on the realization of
we. If off-the-job search is important, a worker's alternative
employment opportunities and his mobility and search cost cannot
be known before after search has been undertaken. If we assume
that we' at the time when an employment reduction is considered,
is known only up to a probability distribution, it could be true
that the workers' expected utility from alternative employment
is high enough to justify layoffs. However, those workers actu-
ally laid off could be unlucky and for instance only find jobs
with wages below their reservation wage. But this cannot by
itself explain involuntary unemployment: The firm could insure
the workers against this uncertainty, for instance by letting
unsuccessful searchers return to the firm. However, several
authors, (e.g. Arnott, Hosios and Stiglitz (1983), Geanokopolos
and Ito (1981), Ito (1984), Kahn (1985), Moore (1985) and Strand
(1985)) have focused on adverse selection and moral hazard prob-
lems of such insurance when search intensity and search outcome
are unobservable by the firm. First when we incorporate incom-
plete insurance against uncertainty about we' we have a model
which allows both for layoffs and involuntary unemployment - as
opposed to the present model, where all laid-off workers are
guaranteed to find alternative employment.
Another important aspect of the present model is that all other
non-convexities except the one focused on here, are assumed
away. It is obvious that there also could be important noncon-
vexities in the producion technology. Further, there could be
nonconvexities in the tax system. In some countries the rules
for public unemployment insurance are such that it is easier to
"extract" public unemployment benefits with layoffs than with
worksharing. (For instance, this is the case in U. S. A. and
Canada.) Also, as pointed out by FitzRoy and Hart (1985), pay-
roll taxes are in some countries more or less a fixed cost per
worker, obviously this creates a bias towards layoffs.
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Also, the model in the previous sections assumes that layoffs
take place in a completely random manner. This is not necessar-
ily so, ann there could be some scope for the firms managing to
layoff the relatively less productive among equally paid wor-
kers. Layoffs therefore could yield a higher productivity per
remaining unit of labor than worksharing. (Johansen (1982a),
(1982b), Thurow (1981).)
Still another explanation of layoffs left out in the present
framework, is that unions could have a decisive influence on
whether and how layoffs are to be used: If seniority rules are
imposed on the firm, the median voter of the union might not be
affected by layoffs, whereas he would be in the case of work-
sharing.
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Notes
* I thank Jan Erik Askildsen, Kåre Petter Hagen, Andrew Oswald,
Erling Steigum, Bj¢rn Sandvik and Jon Strand for useful comm-
ents. The usual disclaimer applies.
l) Baily (1977) obtains results somewhat similar to the present
ones when n.iscussing the choice between worksharing and lay-
offs. However, he used a framework with risk-neutral work-
ers.
2) It is an old discussion in labor contract theory whether one
should or should not include private severance pay among the
firm's policy variables. I have rather arbitrarily chosen to
do so. This assumption simplifies the results somewhat.
3) In the labor contract literature utility functions of this
type have been used by Hall and Lillien (1979), Chan and
Ioannides (1982), and Grossman and Hart (1981). More general
specifications can be found for instance in Chari (1983),
Green and Kahn (1983), and Brown and Wolfstetter (1985). My
personal belief is that the use of more general utility func-
tions has confused the debate more than it has clearified it
- see the comments on this issue in Bolmstrom and Hart
(1985). But, of course, the reader must bear in mind that our
results would be somewhat more complicated with a more
general utility function.
4) The joint assumptions that the firm has the possibility to
insure its workers also against layoff risk (i.e., that be is
one of the choice variables) and that the value of leisure
can be expressed in money terms, gives our insurance result
(10) and (11) a particularly neat form. Different assumptions
on these accounts would of course alter our results, but not
in a way I consider substantial.
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5) This simple modelling of "duration" of booms and slumps has
its shortcomings. I think the most serious one is the tacit
assumption that the length of the second period (the period
where production takes place) is the same both in the "pri-
mary" firm and in alternative employment.
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MARITAL DIVISION OF LABOR WITH RISK OF DIVORCE:
THE ROLE OF "VOICE II ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS
ABSTRACT
The popular view seems to be that a rising probability of divor-
ce leads to less pre-divorce marital specialization between
market work and domestic work. 'People "learn by doing", and in
the face of a high risk of divorce one becomes vulnerable if one
is too specialized when building up human capital.
Here I investigate one particular "story" about why the proba-
bility of divorce might influence pre-divorce allocation of
time. I assume that it is not possible to write an enforceable
marital contract. I therefore picture that people must rely on
emotional ties to "self-enforce" contracts (which I denote "voi-
ce enforcement"). As a divorce must be expected to weaken the
possibility of such voice enforcement, divorce might influence
pre-divorce allocation of time. The direction of this influence
is (perhaps surprisingly) ambigous even when we assume that the
spouses' (identical) ex post utility functions are homothetic.
However, it remains a distinct possibility that the popular idea
of a higher probability of divorce leading to less specializa-
tion is correct.
Voice enforcement has no role to play when contracts are en-
forceable, or when transactions in perfect credit markets can
act as substitutes for such contracts. One implication of this
is that the "legal infrastructure", Le. the costs of writing
and enforcing contracts, matters for the extent to which the
probability of divorce influences pre-divorce allocation of
time.
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MARITAL DIVISION OF LABOR WITH RISK OF DIVORCE: THE ROLE OF
*"VOICE" ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTS
1. Introduction.
Traditionally economists have considered the household to be the
basic decision unit. In recent years, however, there has been a
growing interest in how decisions are reached within a house-
hold, and in the institution of marriage. A pioneer in this
field has been Gary Becker (e. g. (1973), (1974), (1981». It is
a tendency in this line of work to study economic aspects of
marriage isolated from the emotional ones. The "economic as-
pects" of marriage are most often the gains from the spouses'
division of labor between domestic work and market work, or the
gains from some homeproduced goods being family-specific public
goods.
This paper focuses on why and how the probability of divorce
might influence pre-divorce allocation of time. I investigate
one particular "story" in which I suppose that it is not possib-
le to write an enforceable marital contract. The spouses must
therefore rely on emotional ties to "self-enforce" contracts. As
a divorce must be expected to weaken the emotional ties between
the spouses and thereby the scope for using these for informal
enforcement of contracts, the probahility of divorce might in-
fluence the pre-divorce allocation of time.
In this paper we concentrate on the case where the gains from
marriage arise due to specialization in different lines of work.
Suppose that there are some goods which must be produced at home
and which do not have perfect market suhstitutes. Normally,
people's comparative advantages would be best utilized if they
could trade with the whole market. But as this is blocked, the
second best is to "trade" with one' s spouse.
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A central assumption of this paper is that people "learn-by-do-
ing". If somebody in one period specializes in market work or
domestic work he or she will build up human capital of the one
kind or the other. We would therefore perhaps expect that the
possibility of divorce would influence the value of different
kinds of human capital investments, and thereby also the pre-
divorce decisions about division of labour. E.g., if one spends
much time on domestic work, one builds up human capital in
domestic work but not in market work, and this could be a dis-
advantage after a divorce.
In section 2 I start out with a benchmark model in which it
turns out that the probability of divorce does not influence
pre-divorce allocation of time. However, the key assumptions of
this model are carefully chosen to produce this result: I ass-
ume, among other things, that contracts are costless to write
and fully enforceable by a third party. Further, I assume that
there are no credit markets and that the homeproduced good is a
private good. Within this set-up the spouses can insure each
other against the risk connected with building up specialized
human capital, and a divorce will have no real economic conse-
quences.
What happens when contracts are not fully enforceable? People
must then resort to informal ways of enforcing contracts. In
section 3 I introduce the concept of "voice enforcement" of con-
tracts, meaning that people rely on emotional ties to implicitly
enforce contracts. We would expect marital contracts to be more
easily "voice" enforceable if the marriage continues than if the
couple is divorced.
However, in section 4 I demonstrate that if credit markets are
complete (in a very strong sense) they can substitute for the
transfers contingent on divorce specified by an enforceable
contract - and therefore voice enforcement has no role to play.
In section 5 I comment upon the third key assumption of the
benchmark model, namely that the homeproduced good is an ordi-
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nary private good, transportable at no cost. This assumption is
made in order to isolate the effect of "voice enforcement": When
the homeproduced good is a family-specific public good, or there
in some sense are economies of scale from living together, a
divorce means that these economies of scale will no longer be
utilized: In turn, this means a divorce has real economic conse-
quences no matter whether or not contracts can be enforced. I
would like to stress that the models of this paper are tailored
to introduce the concept "voice enforcement of contracts" and to
investigate under what circumstances this enforcement mechanism
might he important. It has not been my aim to provide an all-
embracing and fully realistic account of marital life.
The main model of this paper, found in section 6, investigates
the case where contracts are not third-party enforceable and
where credit markets do not substitute for this lacking enforce-
ability. Here voice enforcement will be taken into use - and
this leads to a situation where the probability of divorce does
matter for pre-divorce time allocation. However, the direction
of this influence is ambiguous even when we assume that the
spouses' (identical) ex post utility functions are homothetie.
Finally, section 7 concludes the paper.
As already hinted at: I think one basic insight from this analy-
sis is that the economic and emotional sides of a marriage can-
not be studied separately, as the emotional aspects might be
important for the enforcement of implicit contracts and there-
fore have economic consequences. This is in contrast to almost
the whole body of economic literature on marriage.l)
It should be clear from this introduction that parts of the
economic theorv of marriage bears a close resemblance to the
theory of international trade. A married couple exchange market
goods and homeproduced goods between themselves - two countries
specialize in different lines of production and export and im-
port goods. Moreover, the theory of relationship-specific capi-
tal (e.g. Grout (1984), Crawford (1983» is somewhat parallel to
this theory of marriage, as it concentrates on the vulnerability
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arising from relationship-specific investments in the absence of
long-term contracts. However, the economic theory of marriage is
not a mere application of international trade theory or the
theory of relationship-specific investment. The main difference
is that the spouses, as portrayed here, not only transfer market
goods and homeproduced goods to "trade" at an implicit price.
They also transfer goods for distributional reasons. E.g., if
there were no comparative advantages, but one spouse had abso-
lute advantages in both lines of work, we would expct to see
transfers from the more able spouse to his or her partner. Marr-
iage is so to speak not only a trading relationship, but also an
institution of redistributive taxation (and many other things).
2. A Benchmark Model.
I will here develop a basic model which will be used as a point
of reference throughout the paper. This model is quite similar
to those of Gronau (lq73, lq77), except for the possibility of
divorce being allowed. The key assumption of this version of the
model will be that contracts are fully enforceable, that there
are no credit markets, and that homeproduced goods are private
goods. These assumptions will produce the result that divorce
does not matter for the family allocation of time.
The model is a two-period one. In the beginning of period one
two persons, denoted A and B, enter into marriage for emotional
reasons, exogenous to the model. At the start of their marriage
the spouses decide on their present and future allocation of
time. They also agree upon present and future money transfers
and transfers in kind of homeproduced goods between themselves.
These decisions, "the marital contract", will in this section
be assumed to constitute a binding and enforceable contract.
Further, these decisions are assumed to be taken "in harmony",
i. e., to maximize a family welfare function. (An alternative
approach would be models of "conflict", where the gains from
marriage are split according to bargaining strength (see e. g.
Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981»).
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But albeit this marital contract is entered in harmony, the
spouses take into consideration that they will be divorced at
the end of the first period with subjective probability q. Div-
orce occurs for emotional reasons, exogenous to the analysis.
The reader might object that in real life divorces do not simply
happen - they are the results of people's choices, perhaps und-
ertaken to maximize utility. I.e., the divorc~ probability ought
to be made endogenous to the analysis. In such a broader model,
whether a divorce occurred or not would depend on the economic
concequences of divorce, which in turn would depend on the
spouses's degree of pre-divorce specialization in market work
and domestic work. Divorce could also be due to exogenous fac-
tors, such as emotions. Comparative statics then could be per-
formed with respect to these exogenous factors. I have felt that
my main points are best expressed within the present, simpler
model, where the probablity of divorce is taken to be exogenous.
It might even be realistic that divorces occur due to the emo-
tional breakdown of the marriage, rather than being due to eco-
nomic calculations?2)
The family welfare function, W, will be assumed to be additively
separable, with the two spouses' ex ante utilities entering with
equal weights:3)
(l)
uA and UB are the interpersonally comparable ex ante utilities
of A and B.
Let ujs denote the ex post utility of spouse j = A, B, in time-
state s = O (first period), l (second period, given continued
marriage), 2 (second period, given divorce). I will assume that
uj can be written as:
"O 'l '2UJ = uJ + D[ (l-q) uJ + q uJ ] for j = A, B (2 )
D is a constant discount factor, equal for the two spouses. The
time additivity of the utility function will make comparative
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statics exercises somewhat simpler. Apart from the comparative
statics in section 6 this assumption will not be restrictive.
Further we have the relationship:
s = O, l, 2 (3 )
M denotes consumption of market goods, H of homeproduced goods,
and E of leisure. Marginal utilities are positive, and u is a
concave function. Note that the function u is taken to be the
same for A and B. To simplify, leisure will be taken to be given
exogenously, at the same level for both spouses. It would be
more realistic to treat leisure as a choice variable. A further
step toward realism would be to incorporate that a married coup-
le might have a liking for having leisure together (which indi-
cates a consumption externality).
As there are no credit markets in this model, people spend their
entire money income on market goods in the perio~ when this
jsincome accrues. Money income consists of wage income w •
(l_hjs) (where w denotes wage, and h the fraction of the time
available for market work and domestic work which is spent on
domestic work) and of a possible money transfer, a, which is
received by one spouse from the other.4) We have:
j = A, B s = O, l, 2 (4)
Asa = Bs sa - a s = O, l, 2 (5 )
(The price of the market good is normalized to one.)
The homeprodllced good is assumed to be a private good - this is
an assumption that will be dicussed below. We assume:
j = A, B s = O, l, 2 (6 )
We assume that the spouses' production functions for homepro-
duced goods only differ by the "productivity coefficients" djs.
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We assume f' > O and fl' < o. bjs denotes transfers of home
produced goods to spouse j from the other spouse, in time-state
s. Clearly,
s = O, l, 2 (7)
We will further assume that people "learn by doing". That is,
the spouses' productivities in different lines of work in period
2 are dependent on how many hours they spent at these types of
work in the first period. We write:
for j = A, B (8)
for j = A, B (9)
We assume wj and dj to be strictly increasing, concave func-
tions. The productivities at the outset of the marriage, meas-
'0 '0ured by wJ and dJ , will be taken to be exogenous.
The learning-by-doing conditions (8) and (9) are crucial to the
analysis. These conditions imply that the decisions at time 1
have consequences in period 2. Therefore, the possibility of
divorce in period 2 may influence the couple's allocation of
time in period l. More specifically: The choice between working
at home or in the market in period 1 is (also) an investment in
future ability. This might be a risky investment, as divorce
might alter the relative valuation of period 2 abilities. It is
this link between periods l and 2 which makes the possibility of
divorce influencing pre-divorce allocation of time. This holds
for all the models in this paper.
The conditions (2) - (9) now can be substituted into (1). The
welfare maximization problem of the family then reduces to the
unconstrained maximization of (l).
It is now easy to state the first-order conditions of this prob-
lem and show that they are independent of o. This is done in
Appendix A. The first-order conditions simply say that in opti-
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mum the marginal utility from time spent on domestic work shall
equal the marginal utility from time spent on market work in all
time-states, and that the transfers shall be driven to the point
where the marginal utility gain of the receiving spouse is equal
to the marginal utility loss of the other spouse.
What is the intuition behind this result that the family allo-
cation of time is independent of q? In the model marriage can be
viewed as having an emotional and an economic side. The economic
aspects of a marriage consist of two people being able to real-
ize gains from specialization. With the described marital con-
tract, this specialization survives the dissolution of the mar-
riage: At the start of the marriage the couple binds itself to
transferring the same amount of money and H-goods irrespective
of a divorce having occured or not. In this sense divorce
implies the end of the emotional side of the marriage, but not
the economic one. Therefore it is not surprising that the proba-
bility of divorce has no influence on the allocation of the
spouses' time between market work and domestic work.
But as already underlined, this version of the model is a bench-
mark one: Its key assumptions were chosen not for their realism,
but to produce the irrelevance-of-probability-of-divorce result.
In the next three sections we will try to get a better under-
standing of the three central assumptions of this version of the
model: That contracts are fully enforceable, that there are no
credit markets and that the homeproduced good is a private
good.
Note that if we should take this benchmark setting seriously,
(which I think we should not) such that the economic and emo-
tional aspects of a marriage really could be separated, there
should be no reason why one should not have one "economic spou-
se" and one "emotional spouse". (By "economic aspects" of the
marriage is here meant the transfer agreements.) One could for
instance marry "economically" somebody which was very different
from oneself - in order to maximize gains from specialization.
Emotionally one would perhaps prefer to choose otherwise.
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3. Voice Enforcement of Marital Contracts.
Several authors have focused on the problems of enforcement of
contracts by a third party, due to the costs of specifying and
verifying the contract elements. When third-party enforcement is
not possible the parties to the contract must rely on "self-
enforcement", i. e., they must limit themselves to contracts
which no party has an incentive to breach. E. g. Klein and Leff-
ler (1981), Shapiro (1983) and Strand (1983) focus on the threat
of terminating a relationship as a discipline device - and char-
acterize the resulting consequences. In Hirschmann's (1970)
terminology: These authors focus entirely on "exit" as a disci-
pline device, but neglect enforcement by "voice".
In many contexts people care for their esteem in the eyes of a
contract partner: People fear a loss of reputation, not only
because a bad reputation may lead to some relationships being
terminated, but because they care about their reputation in
itself. This kind of reputational enforcement I will denote
"voice enforcement".5) Presumably, voice enforcement will be
most important in cases where people are strongly emotionally
attached to each other. Marital contracts would then be a prime
example of contracts where voice enforcement is important, but
not necessarily the only one.
In this paper I will model voice enforcement in a simplified
manner: I will assume that as long as a couple remains married
their marital contract will be fully enforceable by voice enfor-
cement. As soon as they are divorced, however, no contract is
enforceable. Realistically, even when husband and wife care
about what the other thinks of them, this does not necessarily
imply that contracts between them are fully enforceable. Con-
versely, people may also care about what their former spouse
thinks of them after a divorce (but presumably to a lesser ex-
tent than had they remained married): This implies that cont-
racts contingent on divorce might not be completely unenforce-
able. To sum up: Our assumption that contracts are fully enfor-
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ceable when a couple remains married and not at all enforceable
after a divorce may be seen as dramatizing the difference be-
tween the states divorce/no divorce.
Note that in this paper it is the possibility of exit enforce-
ment that is assumed away, as divorce is taken to occur exogen-
ously. But note further that if divorce somehow had been endo-
genized in the model, exit enforcement still would not play an
important role here. This is because we have assumed voice en-
forcement to be very forceful. Contracts are perfectly enforced
through voice enforcement as long as the couple stays together,
only after a divorce do problems occur. These problems, however,
cannot be resolved by the threat of divorce (exit enforcement)
as the couple already is divorced.
In relation to our benchmark model, our enforceability con-
straint can be stated formally as:
2 2a = h = O (10 )
But, as we soon shall see, whether or not this enforceability
constraint really is binding, depends heavily on the credit
market structure.
I think a remark on alimony is due at this point. By alimony I
will here mean transfers between the spouses after a divorce,
established by a judge or by adminstrative rules, as opposed to
transfers which originate from voluntary contracts. Clearly,
alimony in this sense to some extent substitutes for contracts
contingent on divorce. But there are limits to such substitu-
tion: First, an alimony set by a judge will only by coincidence
be equal to the optimal contracted transfer of a2. This is both
because a judge does not know the parameters and functional
forms of the problem as well as the spouses themselves and be
cause his aim may not be to maximize family welfare. His goal
could for instance be to secure a minimum level of welfare for
the least well-to-do spouse, or make the parent who does not
live together with the children pay a fair part of the expenses
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of child-rearing. Second, such an alimony will normally be a
money transfer - and when homeproduced goods to some extent are
transferable the optimal contract might entail transfers of
homeproduced goods between divorced spouses.
Carl Shapiro (1983) has drawn attention to the importance of
"standarns" when there are problems of enforcing contracts. A
"standard", e.g. a minimum quality standard, will on the one
hand limit the freedom of contracting, but on the other hand
reduce the enforceability problem. The optimal standard strikes
a balance between these two considerations. I think alimony in
the sense described here functions in a rather parallel manner
to such "standards".
4. Credit Market Transactions as Substitutes for Transfers
Contingent on Divorce.
In this version of the model I will assume that the enforceabil-
ity constraint (10) holds, but that there at the same time are
perfect credit markets. I will assume that there exist both a
competitive credit market for money (i. e., for market goods)
and a competitive credit market for non-marketed homeproduced
goods. Especially the latter part of this assumption is of
course dramatically unrealistic. Howe ver, these very strong
assumptions bring out very clearly how credit markets can be
used as substitutes for enforceable contracts. Perhaps one in-
sight from this section is precisely that credit markets must be
perfect in a very strong sense if they shall fully substitute
for contracted transfers. The realism of the complete credit
markets assumption will be further discussed below.
From the benchmark model in section 2 conditions (l) - (3), (5),
(7) - (9) still apply. In addition we have the enforceability
constraint (10). However, the budget constraints for market
goods and homeproduced goods, (4) and (6), must be replaced by
the following conditions:
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for j = A, B
s = O, l, 2
(11)
jsn for j = A, B
s = O, l, 2
(12)
jsHere m denotes money loans for person j in time-state s.
(Savings can be viewed as negative loans.) Correspondingly, jsn
denote loans in the credit market for homeproduced goods.
Clearly, we must have the following restrictions:
'l '2 'OmJ = mJ = {1+r)mJ for j = A, B (13)
'l '2 'OnJ = nJ = - (l+i)nJ for j = A, B (14)
Here r and i denote the interest rates in the two credit mar-
kets.
Now, by studying the first-order conditions of this problem we
can see that the optimal solution is the same as in the bench-
mark model. This is shown in Appendix B. In other words, the
credit markets have rendered the use of transfers contingent on
divorce superfluous.
I will here outline the intuition behind this result: Say that
in the optimal solution, B transfers a~ to A. When transfers
contingent on divorce are not enforceable, B can increase his or
0*her transfer to A in period l by a . ~his transfer can be fin-
anced by a loan at interest rate r. A saves this money, and
will in period 2 receive (l+r)aO*. If the marriage has survived,
A returns the money to B, who uses them to repay his debt, which
0*now amounts exactly to (l+r)a . In case of divorce, however, A
keeps this money, and B must repay the debt out of his or her
0* .own pocket. With an appropriate size of a , this would exactly
d 'A 2* , t d' Th d'tcorrespon to B paY1ng a cont1ngen on 1vorce. e cre 1
market for homeproduced goods can be used in a parallel manner
to render transfers of H-goods contingent on divorce super-
fluous.
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However, perfect credit markets in the sense above no not exist.
First of all, there is no credit market for homeproduced goods.
Why is this? Generally, we must expect that for the same reasons
as there are no spot markets for homeproduced goods (high costs
of transportation and marketing), there will not exist credit
markets for these goods either. How serious this is, depends on
how close substitutes market goods and homeproduced goods are:
If they are close substitutes, the loss from not having access
to a credit market for homeproduced goods or from not being able
to transfer H-goods contingent on divorce might not be very
large.
But also the assumption of a perfect credit market for money is
a strong assumption. In many economies consumer loans are rati-
oned. But even with an unregulated credit market, people may
feel that they are rationed. with uncertainty and asymmetric
information people may experience rationing because they cannot
convince the hanks that their future earnings prospectives are
as promising as they themselves believe. (For one study of endo-
genous credit rationing, see Stiglitz and Weiss (1980).)
Even with perfect credit markets, our "story" depends on the
spouses having separate ownership to bank accounts, and a will-
ingness to use credit markets as prescribed here. It might be
argued that such visible preparations for a possible divorce
would involve emotional strains and might carry social stigma.
The reader must be his own judge about the relevance of this
argument.6)
Credit markets may be incomplete in many ways: In the model in
Section 6 I have chosen to examine the extreme case with no
credit markets at all. However, we turn first to a discussion of
the third key assumption of the benchmark model, namely that the
homeproduced good is an ordinary private good.
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5. The Nature of the Homeproduced Good.
In this paper we have mostly assumed that the homeproduced good
is an orninary private good, tranferable at no cost. This
assumption has not been chosen for its realism, but rather to
bring more clearly out that one reason why divorce might influ-
ence the family's allocation of time is because it influences
the possibility of enforcing implicit contracts. Clearly, there
are public good aspects of many homeproduced goods, as child
rearing, house cleaning etc. Moreover, many homeproduced goods
are services which can be rather costly to transfer to somebody
you do not live together with. There might also be emotional
costs connected with performing services for a former husband or
wife.7)
A key aspect of all models presented here is that homeproduced
goods are not marketed, nor do they have perfect market substi-
tutes. The underlying explanation for this must be that there
are high costs of transportation ann marketing. This does not go
very well together with our assumption that homeproduced gOOds
are ordinary private goons, transportahle at no cost. This must
be kept in mind while interpreting the results. In Appendix C I
show how the benchmark model is altered when an assumption about
the homeproduced good being a family-specific public good is
added. We see that now the probability of divorce influences the
allocation of time irrespective of whether contracts are en-
forceable. A divorce has real economic effects in that the econ-
omies of scale from living together is no longer utilized.
(Appendix C should be read after Section 6, as the analysis is
somewhat parallel.)
The analysis of Appendix C might perhaps be viewed as the eco-
nomics of sharing a flat, rather than the economics of a family.
On the other hand, our theory of voice enforcement demands emo-
tional ties between the spouses, and can therefore be viewed
more specifically as a theory of the family.8)
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6. Enforceability Constraints/No Credit Markets.
I will now turn to a model where there are enforceability con-
straints with regard to transfers contingent upon divorce and
where there are no credit markets. Homeproduced goods will still
be considered private goods. The discussion in the previous
sections suggests that within this setting divorce probability
will influence time allocation. We now turn to study how time
allocation will be influenced, and will especially be interested
in the effect on pre-divorce time allocation.
The natural model choice would now perhaps be equations (1) -
(9), with addition of the enforceability constraints (10). How-
ever, this constitutes a model with ten choice variables, which
in turn would render the comparative statics rather messy. I
have therefore chosen to work within a simplified model.
It will now be necessary to say something about the relative
productivities of the spouses. I will assume that spouse A al-
ways has an absolute advantage in market work, and that spouse B
always has an absolute advantage in domestic work. Formally,
irrespective of choice of hjO, I assume:
(15 )
, 'l '2Remember that wJ denotes the common value of wJ and wJ •
A simplified model
I will assume that the state of affairs initially can be descri-
bed as the equilibrium of the model consisting of equations (l)
- (10), for a given q. However, in the short run after a change
in q only the time allocation of spouse B will be variable. The
time allocation of spouse A and the transfers will be treated as
constants.
A justification for these assumptions could be that we consider-
ed spouse B as the marginal worker of the family. The labor
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supply of spouse B, which we in a sexist manner might envisage
to be the female, would then be more easily adjusted than that
of her husband. We could also picture that transfers are more
sluggishly adjusted than the labor supply of the wife, for in-
stance because varying transfers requires communication and
consensus between two persons.
These assumptions mayor may not be deemed realistic. In any
case, they grossly simplify the problem. I further believe that
this simplified version of the model brings out insights that
are valid also in more realistic specifications of the problem.
A further simplifying assumption will turn out to be convenient:
I assume that the utility function u is homothetic. The homothe-
ticity assumption implies that relative demand for the two comm-
odities depends only on relative prices (measured in time cost).
This excludes income effects from playing a role. This is impor-
tant to have in mind when interpreting the results.
T t . hAO hA.l hA2 O l 2 bO bl and b·2 t trea lng , , , a , a , a" Il as cons an s,
the first-order conditions of the problem will be as follows:
(16 )
(17)
oW
~
(lA)
In all three time states the marginal utility derived from
domestic work shall equal that derived from market work.
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The Time Allocation at Date 2.
Our ultimate concern will be how hBO is influenced by a change
in q. However, as a step towards this end it is necessary to
, Bl B2flnd out how hand h compare. In the Benchmark Model we had
'l '2the result that hJ = hJ for j = A, B which lead to the irrele-
vancy-of-divorce-probability result.
State l and state 2 differ only in that transfers are allowed in
the first but not in the latter. It is therefore rather intui-
Bl B2tive that the comparison of hand h depends on the direc-
tions of transfers in state l: Our first task will be to estab-
lish these. When it comes to comparative statics we have assumed
that the transfers are constants. Remember however that the sign
and magnitude of these transfers originally was established as
the optimal solution to the model consisting of (l) - (10), for
the original value of q. It can be established that in state l
spouse A transfers market goods to B, whereas B transfers home-
d d d A, l O bl > Oh' , h fpro uce goo s to , 1.e., a <, • T lS lS sown or-
mally in Appennix D. Note that I had to use assumption (15)
about absolute advantages to obtain this. People familiar with
Ricardian trade theory might think that an assumption of com-
parative advantages should suffice. But as underlined in the
introduction, transfers within a family is not only "trade", but
also redistribution to maximize family welfare. Therefore, the
theorems of trade theory are not directly applicable on this
arena.
Now we can turn to the main issue of this subsection, namely the
comparison of hBl and hB2. Using the first-order conditions (17)
and (18), we obtain:
(19)
We define pBl and pB2 implicitly by rewriting (19) as:
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(20)
As we have assumed u is a homothetic function, pBl is a decreas-
, f t' f h 'HBl/MBl B2, h d1ng unc 10n o t e rat10 , and p 1S t e same ecreas-
, f ' f 82/ B2 B2, d"1ng unct10n o HM. P 1S therefore a ecreas1ng funct10n
B2only of h (as there are no transfers in this state), whereas
Bl, ft' f hBl 1 d blP 1S a unc 10n o , a an .
Let us start out with the assumption that hBl = hB2 (at any
level) . We know that the two states differ by the transfers
1 < O and bl > o. This implies:a
HBl < H
B2
for hBl hR2 (21)~1Bl ;p =
Then, obviously
Bl > B2 for hBl hB2 (22)p P =
B2 .. BlWhen we keep h at the same level as h ,going from state l to
state 2 only implies the removal of the transfers. This reduces
the relative value of H-goods to M-goods, according to condition
(22). In turn, this'seems to give B incentives to work less at
home and more in the market. And, indeed, condition (20) and
(22) together imply:
(23)
The spouse which is most able in domestic work will work less at
home in case of divorce than if the marriage had continued.
I th d'ff b t Bl d B2 h' h dtwas e 1 erence e ween p an p w 1C encourage
spouse B to work relatively less at home after a divorce, It
seems therefore natural to believe that B will never work so
much at home as to reverse the inequality of (22). This turns
out to be correct. Taking (23) together with (20) we have that
in optimum:
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(24)
The Probability of Divorce and the Pre-Divorce Time Allocation.
A standard classical comparative statics exercise, which can be
found in Appendix E, yields the following result:
sign dh
BO
sign ~l'aq- =
where ~ l [ B2 f{hB2 )
Bl f{hBl)J B'= uH - uH d
_ [u~2(1_hB2) _ u~l(l_hBl)] B' (25)w
Note that the assumption of u being homothetic underlies the
particular simple form of (25).
Let us try to interpret ~l' We know that both market work and
domestic work lead to a period 2 productivity increase in the
respective line of work. As one works more at home and less in
the market in the one state than the other, the probability of
the two states clearly affects the value of such productivity
increases due to learning-by-doing. Through this channel first
period time allocation is influenced. If one increases hBO this
increases productivity in domestic work and reduces the produc-
tivity in market work in period 2. The quantity ~l is the deriv-
ative of this combined productivity increase and decrease with
respect to q (with the positive constant D removed). Therefore,
a positive ~l will make domestic work in period l more attrac-
tive relative to market work after an increase in q, and vice
versa for a negative ~l'
However, it turns out that the sign of ~l cannot be decided un-
ambigously. First, we know from condition (23) that hBl > hB2
This means that after a divorce spouse B works relatively less
at home. This implies that the (expected) value of increased
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productivity in domestic work ann decreased productivity in
market work will fall if q rises. And we see from (25) that
Bl B2h > h tends to make ~l negative.
But the expected value of productivity increases and decreases
in the two lines of work does not only depend on how many units
of H-goods and M-goods that are produced in the two states, but
also on the value of these goons. We see from (25) that the
relevant expressions of value are the marginal utilities of the
two goods in the two states. We know from condition (24) that
PBI > pB2 . This is compatible with three cases
(a) Bl B2 and Bl < B2uH > uH uM ~
(b) Bl < B2 and Bl < B2uH uH uM ~
(c) Bl > B2 and Bl B2uH uH uM > uM
If case (a) holds, we see from (25) that with hBl > hB2 the sign
of ~ l is unambigously negative.
Let us now look at case (b). Here the marginal utilities of both
goons are higher in state 2 than in state l. This implies that
spouse B has less of both goods after a divorce, i.e., she is
"poorer". (As both spouses lose from less specialization, where-
as one loses and one gains from redistributive transfers being
stopped, we can either have that both spouses are poorer in
state 2 than l, or that one spouse is better off and the other
is worse off.) As u:2 > ~l this mi~ht make the first bracketed
expression positive. In turn, if dB is large enough relative to
wB', we might get that ~l is positive.
To get some sort of a grip on the intuition behind this result,
B'I think it is useful to consider the special case where w = O
B'and d > O • Now, after a divorce spouse B works less at home
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and homeproduced goods are less worth compared with market goods
(conditions (23) and (24». This tends to make a productivity
increase in domestic work less valuable. On the other hand,
spouse B is poorer after a divorce, which implies that her ex-
pected utility in the second period is less the higher the pro-
bability of divorce. The higher the probability of divorce, the
more spouse B wants to "move utility" from the first to the
second period. But as she in this model has no access to credit
B'markets or state-contingent markets, and as w = O, this can
only happen by her building up much productivity in domestic
work. This effect taken alone indicates that spouse B works more
domestically if the divorce probability rises. And we cannot
know which effect dominates.
However, it seems very unrealistic that it should be very much
easier to build up human capital by learning-by-doing in domes-
tic work than in market work. On the contrary, we would expect
B' B'the reverse to hold. If we assume d = O and w > O, we see
from (25) that ~l is unambigously negative also in case (b).
Finally, let us turn to case (c). Bere the marginal utility of
both goods are lower after a divorce, implying that spouse B has
Bl B2.more of both goods, i.e., she is "richer". As uM > uM ' ~t
might be that the second bracketed term in (25) is negative.
B' B'With w large relative to d (which I find more realistic than
the reverse), ~l might be positive. The intuitive explanation
follows the same lines as in case (b).
To sum up: We have not been able to sign ~l unambigously. How-
ever, there are strong effects that point to the "intuitive"
result that ~l is negative. At least it is a fair chance that
the common belief that an increase in the probability of divorce
leads to less pre-divorce specialization is correct within the
setting of this section.
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7. Concluding Remarks.
The main message of the paper has been that one possible route
through which divorce probability can influence time allocation
is that divorce weakens the scope for "voice enforcement" of
implicit contracts between spouses. The direction of this influ-
'ence is ambiguous, but it is not unlikely that a higher proba-
bility of divorce would lead to less specialization due to pro-
ductivity differences between the spouses. This could be one
possible explanation for the joint rise of the number of divorc-
es (and thereby people's subjective probability of divorce) and
of female labor market participation, observed in many countri-
es. This stylized fact, of course, could have many other explan-
ations as well: For instance the causality might be the reverse:
Less specialization makes the economic consequences of divorce
less drastic, and therefore the probability of divorce rises.
Further, the joint rise of divorces ana female labor market
participants might not be linked by direct causality, but both
be caused for instance by changing attitudes to female roles.
If it is true that the enforcement problem is of significant
practical importance, a policy implication might be to make
explicit contracting cheaper. With low probabilities of divorce,
voice enforcement may have rendered explicit contracting super-
fluous. In the face of present divorce rates, this might no
longer be so. Measures towards making explicit contracts cheaper
could include the design of standard contracts, or simplifying
the system of legal enforcement.
Alternatively, the analysis could be given a normative interpre-
tation. It might well be that most families do not maximize
family welfare as decribed here. r1any actual choices tend to be
far less "rational" than economists perceive them to be. But if
a couple really wants to maximize family welfare, they should
make use of contracting possibilities and credit market transac-
tions as hinted at here. The existing contracting possibilities
could be rather good, were they only taken into use. Especially,
the use of credit markets to substitute for contracts, I suspect
is rather unfamiliar to most people. Perhaps a married couple
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has better possibilities of insuring themselves against falls in
the value of different types of human capital than one might
think, and these possibilities should be taken advantage of.
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APPENDIX A.
In this appendix we state the first-order conditions of the
benchmark model in Section 2, and show that the optimal solution
is independent of q. We will assume that the first-order condi-
tions characterize an interior maximum. Subscripts H and M will
denote partial derivatives with respect to H and M in the re-
spective time-state. The first-order conditions are as follows:
+ q j2 wjl (1_hj2)]} = O for j = A, But1
oW [o 'l djl fl(hjl) jl wjl]
ohJ1
= (l-q) uJ - O ur-1 = OH
for j = A, B
oW [o '2 dj2 fl (hj2) O j2 wj2 ]
ohj2
= q uJ - uM = OH
for j = A, B
(Al)
(A2)
(A3)
Before we look at the first-order conditions which characterize
optimal transfers, we will try to interpret conditions (AI) -
(A3). Even though these conditions may seem messy, their inter-
pretations turn out to be straightforward. Condition (AI) char-
, h h' f hjO , , I ' h '1acterlzes t e c Olce o 1n opt1mum .. n opt1mum, t e rnarglna
utility derived from time spent on domestic work shall equal the
marginal utility derived from time spent working in the market.
The marginal utility from spending time on domestic work in the
first period consists of the extra utility from having more
homeproduced goods in the first period, but also from having
more H-goods in both states in the second period, due to the
learning effects. The marginal utility loss from working less in
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the market in the first period can be split into corresponding
terms. And as mentioned, in optimum the marginal utility from
having more homeproduced goods in all time-states shall equal
the marginal utility loss from having less market goods.
Conditions (A2) and (A3) have similar interpretations: that the
marginal utility derived from time spent on domestic work in
optimum shall equal the marginal utility derived from time spent
on market work. However, conditions (A2) and (A3) have a some-
what simpler structure than (AI), as there are no learning eff-
ects in the last period.
Before we state the last six first-order conditions, it will be
convenient to introduce some new notation. We define:
1 if s = O
vjs l auj with { (l-q) if s 1 (A4)- •
aMJs Ps
= =M Ps q if s = 2
1 if s = O
vjs 1 auj with { (l-q) if 1 (AS)- •
oHJs Ps
= s =H Ps q if s = 2
The V's can be interpreted as the (family and individual) margi-
nal utilities of homeproduced goods and market goods in differ-
ent periods and states - except for the probability of the rele-
vant state being separated out.
The last six first-order conditions are:
oW ~O vBO O--O = =oa M M
oW 0:.0 vBO O
obO = - =H H
oW (l-q) ~l (l-q) vBl = O-1 = -oa M M
(A6)
(A7)
(A8)
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oW (l-q) ~l (l-q) VBI O
obl = - =H H
oW VA2 VB2 O-2 = q - q =oa M M
oW q {2 vB2 O
ob2
= - q =H
(A9 )
(AIO)
(All)
Conditions (A6) - (All) say that transfers - both of money and
of homeproduced goods - shall be driven to the point where the
marginal utility gain of the receiving spouse is equal to the
marginal utility loss of the other spouse.
Within the present setting, how is the family allocation of time
influenced by the probability of divorce? First, note that con-
ditions (A2) - (A3) and (A6) - (All) are independent of q, ex-
cept for the possible effect through q influencing pre-divorce
allocation of time, which in turn influences post-divorce allo-
cation of time thorugh the learning-hy-doing effects. Note also
that as long as u and f are state-independent, a~ they here are
assumed to be, conditions (A2) and (A3) imply:
for j = A, B (A12)
Further, when hjl = hj2 for j = A, B, we also have Mjl = Mj2 and
'l '2HJ = HJ for j = A, B. Condititon (Al) now can be rewritten
as:
As we see, this condition turns out to be independent of q. This
means that all the first-order conditions of the family's maxi-
mization problem are independent of q.
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APPENDIX B.
The two new first-order conditions which characterize the opti-
mal use of the credit markets are:
oW VjD (l+r>[ (l-q) "jl + q v~2] D
omJO
= - =M M
for j = A, B
oW vjD (l+i)[ (l-q) vjl + q va2] D
~
= - =H H
for j = A, B
(Bl)
(B2)
It follows from the first-order conditions (A6) and (AS), which
also apply here, that: vAD= vBD and ~MI = VMBl. Condition (Bl)M M
then implies:
(B3)
Correspondingly: From (A7) and (A9) we have that·v~D
~l = v~l. Then condition (B2) implies:
= vBD andH
(B4)
We see from the first-order conditions (AID) and (All) that if
transfers contingent on divorce had heen enforceahle, such tran-
sfers would have been driven to the point where ~2 = v~2 and
v~2 = v~2. But we see from conditions (83) and (B4) that these
marginal utilities are equalized even without the use of trans-
fers when credit markets are perfect in the sense above. In
other wor ds, credit market have rendered the use of transfers
contingent on divorce superfluous.
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APPENDIX C.
I will here indicate how our analysis would change if we loosen-
ed the assumption that the homeproduced good is an ordinary
private good. I will do this by investigating the benchmark
model of section 2 with an added assumption that homeproduced
goods are family-specific public goods. In this setting divorce
does playa role, even when contracts are costless to write and
to enforce.
The benchmark model consisted of equations (l) - (9). Equations
(l) - (5) and (8) - (9) still apply. Equations (6) and (7),
however, have to be replaced by (6'), (6") and (7').
for j = A, B s = 0, l
Hj2 = dj2 f (hj2) + bj2 for j = A, B
bA2 = - bB2 = b2
(6' )
(6" )
(7 ' )
Condi tions (6') and (6") express that as long as a couple lives
together they both enjoy their combined production of H-goods.
After a divorce one consumes only those H-goods one produces
oneself. As the homeproduced good is a family-specific public
good, transfers of this good is meaningless except in state 2.
This is expressed by (7').
To save space, I will only state the first-order conditions con-
cerning A's allocation of time. The first-order conditions for B
would be corresponding.
oW
~
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A2 A I A2]+ q UM w (l-h ) l = O (Cl)
Alw = O (C2)
A2w = O (C3)
These three first-order conditions are admittedly longwinded,
but so close parallels to conditions (AI) - (A3) that they
should be self-explaining. The first-order conditions (AG),
(A8), (A9) and (All) still apply also within this framework.
N t' that here Al Blo 1ng uH = uH conditions (C2) and (C3) yield:
(C4)
A h d t b h th t' pAl and pA2 f t's we ave assume u o e omo e 1C, are unc 10ns
only of the relative quantities of H-goods and M-goods consumed
in the respective state.
Suppose that hAl = hA2. As the technology is the same in the two
states, we know the total production will be the same in the two
states. Further, we -know that in state 2 transfers will be used
so that A and B both enjoy half of the total production of both
goods. In state l transfers will be used to give A and Beach
half of the total production of r1-goods. Both of them, however,
will enjoy the whole production of H-goods, as these are family
specific public goods. These arguments imply:
HAI
> H
A2
for hAl hA2
~l ~
=
Accordingly,
Al A2 Al hA2P < p for h =
(C5 )
(C6 )
Unfortunately, combining conditions (C4) and (CG) we cannot
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. Al > A2declde whether h < h . Two effects are at play. First, when
both spouses can enjoy a homeproduced good when living together,
the productivity in this line of work is in a sense doubled if
the marriage continues in contrast to state 2. (This is repre-
sented by the number 2 in condition (C4).) This indicates
hAl> hA2. But on the other hand, as one gets more homeproduced
goods, the marginal value of H-goods falls. (This is captured by
condition (C6).) If p is decreasing fast enough with respect to
HIM, it could be optimal to spend less time at horne in state l
than in state 2. A couple living together can so to speak secure
a "sufficient" level of homeproduced goods by working only a
little each at home. Which of the two effects which will domi-
nate, cannot be decided in general.
Al . A2As it cannot be determined in general how hand h compare,
of course the effect on hAO of a rise in q also must be ambig-
OUSe This should be clear from the discussion in Section 6.
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APPENDIX D
In this appendix we will examine the directions of the transfers
in state l. As state l and state 2 are equal except for trans-
fers being allowed in state l we can just as well examine the
directions the transfers would have had in state 2, had they
been allowed.
The relevant first-order conditions are (AI) - (A3) and (A6) -
(A9). Slightly restated, condition (A3) is:
A2 A2__ B2~B2 f'(hB2) _ B2 B2 O- uM w uH u uM w = (Dl)
This can be written as:
A2 A2uM w= B2 B2uM w
(D2)
Rearranging:
(D3)
We define pA2, pB2 and K implicitly by restating (D2) as:
(D4)
The assumption (15) about relative productivities implies that
K < l. Therefore, (D4) can be written as
(DS)
We have assumed that u is a homothetic function. This implies
A2. (d ') f . f h . A2jMA2 Th .that p 1S a ecreas1ng unct10n o t e rat10 H . 1S
ratio, in turn, is increasing in hA2 (as there are no transfers
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A2 o A2 A2 A2and h therefore alone determ1nes H /M ). Hence, p is a
o f o f hA2 C dO 1 B2 o hdecreas1ng unct10n o . orre spon 1ng y, p 1S t e same
do f o f B2/ B2 A2 o f A2/MA2 l B2ecreas1ng unct10n o H M as p 1S oH. A so, P
is a decreasing function of hB2, but this is not the same func-
o A2 A2t10n as p is of h , as abilities differ.
From (DS) we cannot decide which of the spouses who works most
A2 B2 oat home. (DS) holds for h (h , but m1ght also hold for
hA2 hB2 Tho o o o o f h hO h d o o> • 1S 1S 1ntu1t1ve: I B as a very 19 pro uct1V1ty
in domestic work, this will be most utilized if much time is
spent at this line of work. On the other hand, it also means
that B can secure a given quantity of homeproduced goods by
wrrking very little at home. The functional forms and parameters
of the problem decide which spouse spends the more time on do-
mestic work.
However, (OS) will let us determine which spouse consumes more
market goods and which one more homeproduced goods after a di-
vorce. Suppose A consumes more homeproduced goods and B more
~arket goods:
(D6)
(D7)
From the discussion above, we then know:
A2 B2P < P (DR)
Conditions (OS) and (D7) imply:
(D9)
(D9) says that B work longer hours at horne. And as we know that
B is also (absolutely) most productive in home production, we
know:
(D10)
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Correspondingly, we know:
(Dll)
Conditions (DlO) and (Dll) clearly contradict the starting point
(D6) and (D7). Hence we have proven:
(D12)
We know from the benchmark model that had transfers been used in
state 2, we know that they woulo have been used to equate margi-
nal utilities and also levels of consumption of the two goods.
This implies that B will transfer H-goods to A, whereas A trans-
fers M-goods to B.
la < O I (D13)
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APPENDIX E
In this appendix we will look at the comparative statics exer-
cise which leads to the expression (25). Let us start out by
stating the three first-order conditions of the simplified prob-
lem stated in Section 5:
_ {U:OWBO + D[ (l_q)U:IWB' (l_hBI) + qU:2WB' (1_hB2)]} = O
(El)
Bl- w = O (E2)
B2w = O (E3)
By rotally differentiating these equations, we obtain a system
of this structural form:
dhBO
+ a: 12
dhBl
+ a: 13 dh
B2
- ~a: Il aq ---aq aq = l
dhBO
+ a: 22
dhBl
+ a: 23 dh
B2
- ~a: 21 aq ---aq aq = 2
dhBO dhBl dhB2
a: 31 aq + a: 32 aq + a: 33 aq = - ~3
(E4)
(ES)
(E6)
(E4) is (El) totally differentiated, and so on. All the coeffi-
cients a: and ~ are second-order derivatives of family welfare W.
Some of these coefficients will be spelt out below.
Using Cramer's rule, we get:
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-~ a 12 a 13l
-~ a 22 a 232
dhBO -~ 3 a 32 a 33
dq = (E7)
all a 12 a 13
a 12 a 22 a 23
a 13 a 32 a 33
We have:
~ 2 = ~3 = a 23 = a 32 = O (ES)
Recognizing the determinant in the denominator as the Hessian of
W, and using (ES), we obtain:
dhBOsign -aq- = sign ~l • a22 • a33 (E9)
We have:
[ B2 f(hB2) Bl f(hBl)J B'~ l = uH uH d
_ [u B2 (l-hB2) _ u~l(l_hBl>J B'wH
a Bl
dBl f' (hBl) Bl dBl fll(hB)a 22 = P + P
~
_ ap B2 dB2 f' (hB2) B2 dB2 fli (hB2)a 33 -~ + P
(EIO)
(Ell)
(E12)
Both a22 and a33 are negative. Note however that the homotheti-
city assumption about u is necessary to establish this unambig-
ous result. But now (E9) simplifies to
dhBOsign -aq- = sign ~l (E13)
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This is precisely condition (25) in the main text.
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Notes
* I thank Jan Erik ASkildsen, Kristin Dale, Jan Haaland, Kåre
Petter Hagen, Agnar Sandmo, Geir Helge Sj¢tr¢ and Erling
Steigum for comments and discussion.
l) Notions similar to mine, however, can be found in Pollak
(1985) and Weiss and Willis (1985).
2) In e. g. Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) and Landes (1978)
monels are developed where divorce occurs for reasons endo-
genous to the model.
3) It would be simple enough to generalize the model to the case
where the spouses' utilities carrierl unequal weight.
4) I have implicitly assumed that there is symmetric information
about productivities at home and in the labour market. Peters
(1986) analyzes the consequences of asymmetric information.
5) The concept of voice enforcement is similar, but not ident-
ical to Akerlof's concept "social customs" (Akerlof (1980».
In Akerlof's work a "social custom" is enforced by people's
fear for loss of reputation - and people care for their repu-
tations as such, not only about the possible consequences of
such reputational losses. The difference is that Akerlof does
not explain how a social custom comes about - in our setting
it is an optimal contract that is to be enforced. Further,
Akerlof pictures that people care for their reputation in
general - here it is what your contract partner thinks of you
that matters.
6) A similar discussion about the role of credit market trans-
actions as substitute for contracted transfers - in a some-
what different context - can be found in Gunning's (1984)
comment on King (lQS2).
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7) When homeproduced goods have perfect market substitutes, the
family's problem reduces to determine for each spouse whether
he or she can obtain most market goods by working in the
market and buying them or by producing these goods himself
(herself). If homeproduced goods were marketed, every indivi-
dual could realize gains from specialization by trading with
the market rather than with his or her spouse. See Dale
Titlestad (1983).
8) Even though it does not fit completely in with the present
model framework, the most important economies of scale from
living together might be those stemming from the partly in-
divisibility of capital goods as cars, houses, refrigerators
etc.
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Persistent Discrimination with Social Ability as a
Productive Factor
by
KJELLERIK LoMMERUD •
I
Traditionally, economists have assumed that discrimination reflects "tastes"
against a definable group (e.g. BECKER[1957], ALCHIANand KESSEL[1962],
ARROW [1972], [1972 a] and [1973].) Suppose that some employers had a
"taste" against women - and therefore paid male workers more than equally
able female workers. Suppose further that the employer in the short run is a
monopsonist in the labor market. We then know that profit maximization
would imply equal pay for equally productive workers (as long as their elastic-
ities of the wage rate with respect to the employment level also are equal).
Discrimination is a deviation from that policy: hence, an employer must pay
the price of less profits for satisfying his taste for discrimination. Further, in the
long run we would expect other employers - with less or no taste for discrimi-
nation - to hire the cheap female labor. In the end we would wind up with a
situation where discriminating employers employed only males and non-
discriminating employers all the females: the labor market would be segregated,
but no discriminatory wage differentials would exist. (However, AKERLOF
[1980] has pictured that the social stigmatization from breaking the "social
custom" of discrimination can outweigh the pecuniary benefits of non-
discriminatory behavior, such that discrimination persists.)
It could also be that some of the employees of a firm had a "taste" for not
working together with a certain group: for instance, white workers could refuse
to work together with black workers. But again, the long run implication ofthis
would be segregated production, not discriminatory wage differentials.
Further, discrimination could be rooted in the customers having "tastes"
against certain groups producing certain goods. Such discrimination could
* I thank Jan Erik Askildsen, Kåre Petter Hagen, Astrid Ingeborg Kleppe, Agnar
Sandmo and an anonymous referee for comments. This note is a much revised version
of Discussion Paper 12/84, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administra-
tion.
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persist also under perfect competition, but is likely to be most important in lines
of work with direct customer contact.
We see that under perfect competition, discrimination will have a tendency
not to be sustained. But. as ARROW[1973] notes: "Since in fact racial discrimi-
nation has survived for a long time, we must assume that the model ... must
have some limitation."
One approach to the stability of discrimination is the modelling of divide-
and-rule policies. Some writers (REICH [1980], ROEMER[1979] and GINTIS
(1976]) picture that discrimination between equally productive workers can
reduce the bargaining power of the workers. These models, however, do not
describe perfect competition in all markets, as that would leave no room for a
concept as "bargaining power". BoWLES{1985} has suggested that divide-and-
rule discrimination can render surveillance of worker productivity cheaper.
Also, this paper deals with persistent discrimination - in a competitive setting
where employers have no "taste" for discrimination; neither is discrimination
due to variables such as race or sex being proxies for technical ability. l The
basic idea is that the ability to adapt socially to the relevant surroundings is an
important productive factor for some jobs. For instance: a firm wants to
employ a manager. Assume that in order to fit in with the "managerial culture",
one has to be a white, male conservative. A non-conformist manager must be
expected to get less informal information, business proposals etc. from "busi-
ness friends". Let us focus on the role of informal exchange of information.
Suppose that all managers are of one "kind", and that people tend to like others
of their own kind. Suppose further that people exchange bits of information
when they mix with people they like. A prospect manager of a different "kind"
might be excluded from this network of information exchange. He would then
have to obtain information at a cost from other sources, or perhaps have to do
without this information. It would take a lot of extra "technical ability" in a
strict sense to outweigh this disadvantage. Discrimination occurs in the model
in the sense that people with the same "technical" ability, but who differ with
respect to "social" ability, are treated differently. The concepts "technical" and
"social" ability will be defined more precisely shortly. Note that when we take
as given facts who likes who and that friends exchange information informally,
no one stands to gain from breaking this discrimination. A main argument of
this paper is that there is scope for government intervention against this type
of discrimination. Private agents must take the social requirements for filling
a job as given. However, we would expect non-marginal employment decisions,
as for instance a large scale hiring of female managers, to change these social
norms. Such non-marginal employment decisions might be efficiency improv-
ing if they lead to a better utilization of the technical abilities in the population.
1 For instance, see SPENCE [1974].
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Let us develop these ideas more formally. Consider an economy where
everybody delivers inelastically one unit oflabor. This one unit oflabor corre-
sponds to a certain number of efficiency units of labor, depending on an
employee's "technical ability" and "social ability" 2. 3 for doing a job. For
simplicity, assume there are two types of jobs, "managerial" and "unskilled".
Some social abilities are productive for people holding a managerial job, but
would have been less productive for people who work as unskilled. For other
social abilities, it is the other way around. Formally:
(1 a)
(1 b) li'" = t.; (x., Yi) for all i.
Here Ii" stands for the efficiency units of labor which agent i would supply if
employed as unskilled, whereas Ii'" denotes the efficiency units of labor supplied
if he is employed as a manager. Further, Xi and Yi - which may be thought of
as vectors - denote agent i's technical and social ability, respectively.
It is important to note that the functions Ii. and Ij", are postulated to be
independent of how jobs are assembled into plants and firms. The productivity
of a certain social talent in a specific type of job is independent of which firm
one works in. If this shall hold true it must mean that "social ability" to a large
extent refers to the ability to adapt socially to surroundings external to the firm.
If "social ability" only meant the ability to adapt to co-employees of the same
firm, we would basically be back to a model where employees have "tastes" for
whom they prefer to work with. As noted above this implies segregated produc-
tion, but not inequal pay. 4 Of course, different jobs differ greatly with respect
to the importance of firm-external contact. "Social ability" may therefore be of
much larger importance as a productive factor in "managerial" jobs than in
"unskilled". .
For expositional simplicity, I assume that the efficiency units of labor stem-
ming from managerial and unskilled work are perfect substitutes. Further, we
2 Terms as "social productivity" are often used in a quite different meaning, namely
that certain social groups develop counter-productive life-styles and attitudes. See CAIN
[1976] and the references cited therein.
3 In this simple model we assume that people are born with certain social abilities. The
analysis would not be much altered if we allowed for the possiblity that social abilities
could be acquired, but that different people had different costs of obtaining them. To
begin with, we also assume that technical abilities are given facts, but we relax this
assumption below.
4 That people have tastes for whom they would like to work with, is an example of
"hedonic clubs". See for instance DREZEand GREENBERG[1980J. Their starting point is
that people's utilities from working in a coalition depend on who the other members in
the coalition are and how big the coalition is. Dreze and Greenberg then investigate the
optimality and stability of coalitions within this context.
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assume that workers sell their efficiency units of labor at the wage w. Hence,
if worker utility has wage income as its only argument, a worker will choose
managerial occupation if ljm > li"' and unskilled if the inequality is reversed. S
This implies:
(2)
where l, is the actual supply of efficiency units of labor from worker i.
The firm is assumed to maximize profit. If non-labor production factors are
held constant, the firm's problem can be written as:
(3) Max 1t = p/Il) - wi.
l
Here 1t denotes profit, p the price of the output good, I efficiency units of
labor used as input andfthe production function, assumed to meet standard
conditions. The first order condition of the problem is of course:
(4) pf'(l) = w.
The only noteworthy fact about this very simple maximization problem is
that all that counts for the firm is l. Whether it is social or technical ability that
brings about l is of no importance. Therefore, in this model employees are paid
according to their productivity - but this productivity may just as well be
caused by social as technical ability. And people are sorted to different types
of jobs according to relative ability, but again their ability might just as well be
social as technical.
An individual worker must take the structure of how different social abilities
fit with different jobs as given. Therefore it may for instance be optimal for a
worker with a high degree of technical qualification for managerial work, but
who lacks in social qualifications, to choose unskilled work.
As already hinted at, this situation is only efficient if one takes the social
requirements for filling a job as given. The government, which can bring about
non-marginal changes in the labor market, e.g. a large flux of women into
managerial occupations, might be expected to be able to influence these social
requirements. To do this might be efficiency improving as it might lead to a
better utilization of the technical abilities in the population.
S In the present formulation everybody can choose whether to work as a "manager"
or as "unskilled". This is because everybody gets paid only for the efficiency units oflabor
they actually deliver in a specific occupation. This would imply very low - or even
negative - wages for people with low productivity for instance as managers. In practice,
we would not expect wages to be this flexible. Therefore some people would not find
occupation as managers even if they were prepared to accept negative wages.
- 132 -
143/2 (1987) Persistent Discrimination and Social Ability 26S
Let us try to capture this formally. We must start by rewriting (l a) and (1 b):
(Sa)
(Sb)
z. is the "social norm" which decides how productive a certain social ability Yi
will be in unskilled work. z.' in turn, is a function of Y., the vector of social
abilities of those occupied in unskilled work, and "all other factors", =~.g. is
a functional symbol, denoting "efficiency units" of social abilities. gm' Z"', Ym
and z~ have similar interpretation.
It is both beyond the scope of this paper and the competence of its author
to try to pinpoint exactly what social norms apply to what jobs, how such
norms have come about and how they change.
Assume that society is concerned only with efficiency, given by:
(6)
By inserting (Sa) and (Sb) into (2), and (2) into (6), we obtain:
(7) W =Lmax [li.(x., e,(yi' Z. (Y., Z~))),
lim (x,, gm (Yi' Zm (Ym' Z.)))].
Let us calculate two quantities, If. and Ifm' given by.
(8 a)
(8b)
If. and Ifm can be interpreted as workers i's productivity in the two lines ofwork,
seen from the social planner's viewpoint. If will denote the largest of these two
quantities. z. and Z'" are the social norms as they would be when all workers are
employed as they will be in optimum, except for the worker iwhich is not yet
employed. The first terms of(8a) and (8 b) then are the productivities ofworker
i in the two lines of work - if we assume that his employment decision will not
affect the social norms. LIl: is the productivity change for worker n caused by
the change in the social norm Z.' following worker i taking up work as un-
skilled. LIl; is interpreted similarily. The second terms of (8 a) and (8 b) there-
fore capture the sum of the productivity changes for all workers (including
worker i himself) caused by the changes in the social norms. When a social
norm changes, people's productivity can change because they become more or
less productive in the type ofwork they would have chosen also given the initial
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social norm - out it can also be that people choose another type of job than they
else would have done. Note that the second terms in (8a) and (8b) may be of
either sign. Also. note that as Ii. and lim for one individual worker are calculated
given that all other workers are employed optimally, these quantities must be
calculated simultaneously for all workers. In practice, this would of course be
a very messy task. When a worker chooses whether to work as unskilled or as
manager, he will affect the social norms z. and Zm' For the individual worker.
the effect on his own productivity in the two lines of work will be negligible. His
choice also affects the productivity of all the other workers - but this is not
compensated for through a market. Hence, this is an example of a (positive or
negative) externality.
And even if the productivity change for one individual employee induced by
a small change in social norms may be negligible, the sum of these effects for.
all workers may be of considerable importance.
Now, the welfare function (7) will be maximized if a worker i is assigned to
unskilled or managerial work according to a comparison of It. and lim' instead
of Ii. and lim' However, so far we have not been very precise about how the
government should intervene in the labor market. Here, as in many other
contexts, the government has the choice between using taxes/subsidies or
quotas. Ibelieve direct assignment to jobs/quotas might be seen as a too serious
interference with the freedom of contracting to be feasible in democratic socie-
ties. Also, the use of quotas could lead to further stigmatization of women/
blacks and thereby to these groups being even more shut out from informal
networks of information exchange. An alternative to quotas is to use taxes and
subsidies to e.g. increase the cost of hiring white, male managers and to reduce
the cost of managers from other groups. (In this simple, illustrative modelIabor
supply is inelastic. Of course, in practice those who design a tax system should
concern themselves not only with people's occupational choice, but also with
labor supply.) The American system of demanding "affirmative action" against
discrimination from federal contractors can - even though it might look like a
system of quotas - be interpreted as a tax on the labor income of white, male
workers (LEONARDS [1984]). From an economic theorist's viewpoint there
seems to be no reason to limit such taxation to federal contractors, but political
feasibility considerations might account for this limitation.
I think it is important to remember that the type of discrimination we are
talking about here is important only in occupations where a firm-external
network of contacts is important. There are potential problems of using the
traditional measures against discrimination in such a setting. First, the relevant
occupational categories might be so small or so ill defined that a system of
quotas or of taxes/subsidies might be very difficult to implement. Second, as
hinted at, the government intervention itselfmight create unwanted stigmatiza-
tion. Personally I believe it would be a sound policy proposal to try to favor
- by quotas or by incentives - e.g. women in those educational paths which lead
to managerial positions. This should be implementable enough, and as the
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intervention does not take place in the labor market itself. the risk of creating
further stigmatization should be reduced.
II
A complication arises if we consider that technical skills can be acquired by
education. Suppose that workers are characterized by their "primitive technical
abilities" and their costs of acquiring additional skills. The workers now face
a two-step maximization problem. First they must decide on the level of educa-
tion given unskilled and given managerial work. The levels of education will be
chosen in order to equate the marginal wage increase from education with the
marginal cost of education, except for those particular skills where we get
corner solutions.
The second step in a worker's utility maximization problem is to calculate the
utility he will obtain as unskilled or as manager, given optimal education.
Naturally, he will choose the line of occupation which yields the highest utility.
Now, what does the situation look like from the viewpoint of a social planner
which is only concerned about efficiency? It is here important to delineate
between two different scenarios.
We could imagine (unrealistically) that the planner arrives at the scene before
any comitting educational choices have been undertaken. This situation would
be a rather straightforward extension of the model above. In an alternative
(realistic) scenario we could picture that people's occupational and educational
choices are made before the social planner enters the picture, and that people
do not expect any future interference from a planner. We will assume that the
planner thereafter can assign people to further education and order them to
change job (although in most economies incentive schemes would have to be
used.)
When a planner enters the scene after the workers have acquired their "first-
round" education, the cost of this education is sunk. If some people lack the
relevant social ability for a job, they will also have less incentives for acquiring
technical skills for such jobs. In this situation it might be that it would not be
optimal to make a worker change occupation after he has undertaken educa-
tion, even though this would have been optimal had the planner intervened
before any irreversible educational choices had been made.
A policy implication could be the following one: As already mentioned,
people who lack the relevant social ability for ajob, will on average not acquire
very much education relevant for this job. A "crash prograrnme", as the sudden
interchange of a group of managers with a group of unskilled workers, could
subsequently lead to an important immediate efficiency loss, due to large costs
of reschooling. A more gradual policy, aiming at influencing the occupational
choices of newentrants to the labor market (who not yet have made irreversible
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educational choices), could be a much cheaper way of changing for instance the
social norms for managerial behavior.
III
My main point has been that in some jobs social ada pti on and external contacts
are important productive factors. If someone is excluded from such a network
of contacts due to sex, race, beliefs, religion etc. this might be interpreted as
discrimination. And as stressed, such discrimination will not be eroded by
competitive pressures. By way of conclusion I would like to focus on a perhaps
less obvious form of such discrimination than against women or blacks. More
precisely, I would like to point out how the present line of reasoning can shed
some light on a discussion of the relative efficiency of capital-managed and
labor-managed firms in PUTTERMAN[1984].
Several writers (ALCHIANand DEMSETZ[1972], WILLIAMSON[1980], JENSEN
and MECKLING[1979]) have claimed that the superiority of the capital-managed
over the labor-managed firm can be established only by noting that so few
labor-managed firms exist in economies where both organizational forms are
allowed. The argument is that a less productive firm must pay its workers less
if it is to survive. By revealed preference we know that this decrease in pay for
most workers outweigh the benefits of worker control of the firm. If not,
workers would organize labor-managed firms instead of taking employment in
capitalist firms. Another version of this argument is to say that a less efficient
firm which has to reward its workers competitively, will not survive in a market
economy. This form of the argument can be called "economic Darwinism", a
term dating back at least to FRIEDMAN[1953].
PUTTERMAN[1984] argues that the arguments above are too simple: success
in the marketplace does not directly imply economic efficiency Putterman's
most important argument is that the Darwinism of the marketplace single out
locally efficient firms, which not necessarily are globally efficient. " ... the eco-
nomic survivability operator is not a global optimality operator, because it
selects for viability within an existing environment, including its system of laws
and property right" (PuTTERMAN[1984], p. 186).
Of course, Putterman is not the first one to have noted that a market
equilibrium may be locally, but not globally efficient. Much work on incom-
plete markets for "package deals" either deals explicitly with this issue, or can
be interpreted as dealing with it (e.g. DREZE[1974], GROSSMAN[1977], DREZE
and HAGEN[1978], STIGLITZ[1982]). (A "package" can for instance be a pack-
age of contingent claims called a share, a package of quality characteristics
called a consumption good, or a package of working conditions called a job).
Other examples of literature making a point of the distinction between local
and global efficiency are BARANand SWEEZY[1966] and LINDBECK[1977].
IotTer "discrimination" in the sense of this note as an example of how the
market outcome may be locally, but not globally efficient - and which might
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be of relevance for the non-viability of labor-managed firms in capitalist econo-
mies. Prejudice and discrimination in the sense above may not only hurt women
or minorities, but also managers of labor-managed firms. The very fact that a
manager is a hired manager in a labor-directed firm might make him less able
to interact socially with the rest of the business community - and this could be
very damaging 6. The chance of survical for a labor-managed firm might in-
crease if the firm were a member of a group of labor-managed firms, as this
would make contacts external to the group less important. The apparent suc-
cess of the Mondragon group of labor-directed firms might be an example of
this. Also, it might be that if the workers of a labor-directed firm all were highly
qualified "white collar" workers, rather than blue collar workers, labor man-
agement might carry less social stigma. And casual empiricism seems to suggest
that organizational forms that look like labor management (but not necessarily
are named as such) are more common in small, "white collar" firms.
But of course it is difficult to ascertain whether managerial norms in fact do
stigmatize leaders oflabor-managed firms (as "suspect communists"). Whether
the outlined possibility is of practical relevance, is left to the reader's judge-
ment.
In a long survey on the non-viability question, FANNING and MCCARTHY
[1983] claim to present "the more substantial" of the hypotheses on why so few
labor-controlled firms exist in capitalist economies. A "substantial" hypothesis
is defined as one that is not simply based on prejudice. I have tried here to show
that prejudice and discrimination can be given an interpretation which make
these phenomena persistent also under perfect competition. I feel therefore that
it is somewhat out of place to call discrimination an insubstantial phenomenon
- when the non-viability of labor-managed firms is discussed, and in other
contexts.
Summary
We can think of an employee's productivity as depending on his or her "tech-
nical" and "social" ability. By social ability is meant the ability to adapt to a
firm's external network of contacts, and to extract information, business pro-
posals etc. from this network. Individual agents must take the social require-
ments for filling different jobs as given, whereas a government might be able to
influence these. Government intervention might be efficiency improving, as
there is no reason to expect the given existing set of such social requirements
to lead to the best utilization of the technical abilities in the population.
6 Of course, to be a manager in a labor-managed firm is not an inherent trait of a
person, as race and sex are. So when people are socially stigmatized for being hired
managers in labor-managed firms, this could lead to adverse selection problems not
accounted for here.
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Zusammenfassung
Anhaltende Diskriminierung mit sozialer Fdhigkeit als Produk tionsfaktor
Man kann sich vorstellen, daB die Produktivitåt eines Arbeitnehmers von
dessen technischer und sozialer Fåhigkeit abhångt. Mit sozialer Fåhigkeit ist
die Fåhigkeit gemeint, sich auf das externe Kontaktnetz einer Unternehmung
einzustellen und sich uber dieses Netz Informationen, Angebote usw. zu ver-
schaffen. Individuelle Handlungstråger rnussen die sozialen Anforderungen fur
die Ausiibung verschiedener Tåtigkeiten als gegeben hinnehmen, wohingegen
der Staat in der Lage sein konnte, diese zu beeinflussen. Staatliche Intervention
konnte evtl. die Effizienz steigern, da nicht zu erwarten ist, daB die tatsåchlich
gegebenen sozialen Anforderungen die beste Nutzung der technischen Fåhig-
keiten der Bevolkerung bewirken.
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Chapter 6:
EDUCATIONAL SUBSIDIES WHEN RELATIVE INCOME MATTERS
The germ of this paper's main idea can also be found in "Educa-
tional Subsidies when Workers are not Paid their Marginal Pro-
duct", Discussion Paper 13/84, Norwegian School of Economics and
Business Administration, Octoher 1984.
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EDUCATIONAL SUBSIDIES WHEN
RELATIVE INCOME MATTERS
ABSTRACT
This paper postulates that relative income, or "status", enters
people's utility functions, and that the total value of status
in society is largest when inequality is minimized. I propose
that a natural measure for "status" is relative labour income
after tax in the years after a concluded education. Moreover, I
suggest that educational decisions are undertaken in order to
maximize lifetime utility. This leads to a situation where it
might be optimal to tax away some of the differences in people's
labour income - and to use educational subsidies to restore
people's incentives to undertake education.
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l. Introduction
Even though every country I know of subsidizes higher education,
it is not completely clear why this should be so. It might be
argued that the recipients of these subsidies are among the most
resourceful people in the population and the last ones that
ought to be subsidized. A counterargument could be that there
are external effects from education. But even if some activities
lead to more external effects than others, it is not obvious
that the total value of these externalities necessarily increas-
es with the total level of education. Another line of argument
is that credit markets might be incomplete (see e.g. Kodde and
Ritzen (lQS5)), e.g. because of the problems of putting up human
capital as collateral. This could lead to underinvestment in
education, especially among children from poor families which
presumably would have less access to credit. Moreover, those who
do choose to study will not be able to smooth their income over
the life- cycle to the degree they would want. But this line of
thought seems to poiht to loans for schooling, rather than sub-
sidies. Another argument for subsidizing higher education is
that the risk connected with human capital investments is very
difficult to diversify. For the in1ividual student the risk of
not being able to complete his or her education successfully, or
the risk of the market value of a certain skill dropping drasti-
cally is considerable. For society as a whole it only matters
how many people that on average manage to increase their produc-
tivity through education. But this leaves unanswered the ques-
tion why the government can handle the informational problems
which rule out private insurance any better than the private
sector. Moreover, distributional aspects of educational subsi-
dies may not be as clear cut as one might think. ,Johnson (lQS4)
has pointed out that with complementarity between labour with
low and high skills, the relatively poor realize a portion of
the gains from the more able receiving higher education.
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I will here suggest an additional justification for educational
subsidies. I will take as my starting point that people care for
their relative income. This is an old idea in economics (e.g.,
see Veblen (1899), Duesenberry (1949) and Leibenstein (1950»,
although it has never played an important role in the mainstream
of the field. Recent work on the importance of relative income
or "status" include Hirsch (1976), Boskin and Sheshinski (1978),
Layard (1980), Sen (1983), Oswald (1983), Frank (1984a, 1984b,
1985a, 1985b), Orosel (1985), ,James (1987) and Ng (1987). Trade
union models where relative wages matter include Oswald (1979)
and Gylfason and Lindbeck (1984).
However, what exactly is it that yields status? It might not
only be relative income, but for instance education per se. And
what measure of relative income should be used? Income before or
after taxes? Annual income or lifetime income? I will propose
that a natural measure might be labour income after tax in the
years after education is concluded. A fuller discussion of this
suggestion will follow below. The choice of a measure of status
is the present paper' s main departure from Boskin and Sheshin-
ski's (1978) analysis of optimal redistributive taxation when
status matters. Further, I suggest that educational decisions
are undertaken in order to maximize lifetime utility. This leads
to a situation where it might be optimal for the government to
tax away some of the differences in people's labour income - and
to use educational subsidies to restore people's incentives to
undertake education. I point out that one would get similar
results in any other situation where inequality of per period
income after tax for some reason were counterproductive, and
where educational choices were guided by lifetime income con-
siderations.
In section 2 I will illustrate this idea in a rather simple
model. The most restrictive assumption in this model is constant
labour supply, which is loosened in section 3. Section 4 con-
tains some concluding remarks.
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2. A Simple Model
Consider an economy with N individuals, who are identical, ex-
cept that they have different costs of obtaining education. The
model is a two period one. In the first period people have an
. - h" l).. d hexogenous 1ncome w, w 1ch 1S untaxed. In th1S per10 t ey
obtain education. The cost of obtaining units of education, e,
is a function c (e )2), where c' > O and c" > o. Subscript nn n n n
denotes individual n. In the second period, people work. Every
worker supplies E units of labour inelastically. How many effi-
ciency units this labour supply represents, depends on haw much
education has been undertaken. We assume, for simplicity, that
y = e L (where y denotes efficiency units of labour). Then n n
workers sell their efficiency units of labour at the price w to
competitive, constant-returns-to-scale firms which use labour as
their only input.
Let us begin by studying the workers' choice of ~ducation. We
will assume that people maximize utility, and that they have a
common (cardinal) utility function, U. As people have different
costs of obtaining education, reflecting differing abilities,
they will still have different utility levels. We write the
utility of individual n:
(l )
where
unl' un2 = utility in periods l and 2
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s = a subsiny on the costs of eoucation
t = a tax on labour income
a = a lump-sum tax element
g = utility derived from relative income, or "status". We assume
g'> O, g" < O.
S = individual nis status.
n
Some comments are in order on the implications of (l). The simp-
lification that utility is linear in net income and additively
separable in net income and status is used to ease the exposi-
tion, and is not material for the main insights. As an index for
status I have chosen the difference between a worker's after tax
income and the average after tax income. This particular measure
of relative income will be convenient, as it implies that the
lump-sum tax element, a, has no influence on status. Note also
that we have presupposed that status depends on income relative
to average income in the economy as a whole. This contrasts e.g.
with Robert Frank's work on status, mentioned above. Frank most-
ly studies the case where it is relative wages within a firm
which constitute the basis for status. We would expect the truth
to lie somewhere in between. Those "others" who form the basis
for interpersonal comparisons for a given individual are likely
to be determined by spatial proximity and degree of interaction
(Festinger (1954), williams (1975». My assumption has two im-
portant implications relative to Frank's setting. First, firms
will here have no incentive to try to compress wage schemes - as
an individual firm presumably has a negligible effect on the
wage dispersion in the whole economy. (Such a wage scheme com-
pression within a firm is at the center of interest in Frank
(1984a).) Second, a firm trying to compress wage schemes could
experience that those workers paid below their marginal product
moved out. For a state, emigration due to tax pressure certainly
will be a much lesser problem, and will here be abstracted
from.
Perhaps the most important assumption behind (l) is that it is
only differences in after tax income in the second period which
determines status. Low income net of educational expenses does
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not give students low status in period one. I think this is
realistic. It is not irrelevant under which circumstances a low
income is earned. In fact, as education per se might yield
status (which is not modelled here), one might imagine that
students have a higher status than non-students. As already
mentioned, this assumption is a driving force behind my argu-
ment, and represents the main deviation from the analysis in
Boskin and Sheshinski.
Note that we have restricted our attention to linear tax and
subsidy schemes. I will further restrict the choices of sand t
as follows:
-l c s, t .. l (2)
Remember that we have assumed that g' > O and gli < O. I.e.,
there is diminishing marginal utility of status. Also, geO) = O.
The concavity assumption is crucial for the results - but it
will he easy to see how results must be altered if there is
constant or increasing marginal utility of status. A further
tacit assumption behind (l) is that the workers cannot move
income between period l and 2, other than investing in educa-
tion, i.e., there are no saving/borrowing possibilities. ~is is
also crucial, which will be discussed below.
A person chooses e in order to maximize (l). The first-order. n
condition of this problem is:
- ( N-l)(l-t) w L l+g' (S )-n- = (l-s)c' (e )n ~ n n \1n ( 3 )
I.e., in optimum the marginal gain from education should equal
marginal cost. Note that we have tacitly assumed that workers
are entertaining Nash conjectures vis-a-vis each others' choice
of e • If we look at the case where status yield no utility,n
i.e., where g = O always, (3) is reduced to the familiar condi-
tion:
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(l-t) w L = (l-s) c'(e )n n 'iln (4 )
Let us now turn to the government's problem. We will here assume
that the government is utilitarian, wishing to maximize the un-
weighted sum of individual utilities:
Max E Un n (5 )
The government faces a public budget constraint: Net tax revenue
must equal T. Formally,
E (t w e L - s c (e ») + a N = Tn n n n (6)
The government's problem will now be to maximize welfare given
the public budget constraint, given the restriction that I sl and
I ti are less or equal to one, and given that workers choose
their level of education as described. It turns out that for
this very simple form of the problem, the easiest way to arrive
at a solution will be to use intuition to suggest a solution,
and then to show that this comes arbitrarily close to being
first best optimal. A more formal analysis of both of this and
an extended version of the problem will follow in the next
section.
Let us first look at the case where status yields no utility.
Clearly, the lump-sum tax element can be used to take care of
the public budget constraint (6). Taxation will not distort
labour supply decisions, since labour supply is taken to be in-
elastic. It therefore remains for the government to give the
workers proper incentives for acquiring education. In the case
with no taxes or subsidies, a representative worker's first-
order condition w.r.t. choice of educational length, will be
w L = c'(e )n n 'iln (7 )
By comparing (4) and (7) we see that there will be no distortion
of the choice of education if
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s = t (A)
However, the joint level of sand t is indeterminate. (Strictly
speaking, it should not be l, because then a worker would be
indifferent as regards his length of education.)
This means that in the case where only absolute income matters
educational subsidies have no independent role to play. They are
just an indirect way of lowering the tax on income. When the
joint level of s = t is indeterminate, it might as well be zero,
especially if there were some costs (not modelled) incurred when
collecting taxes on labour income and handing the money out
again as educational subsidies.
Let us now turn to the more general case where status might
yielo positive private utility. Again, the lump-sum tax element
a can be used to take care of the public budget constraint. Now,
the government has two additional choice variables, sand t. It
wants to use these to balance the wish to minimize distortions
of educational choices against the wish to maximize the total
value of status in society.
The sum of utility in society derived from status will be larg-
est when there is no inequality at all of after tax labour in-
come in period 2. This follows from the fact that the marginal
utility of status is diminishing. (Had we assumed g to be con-
vex, social welfare would be largest if inequality was maxi-
mized.) A situation of no inequality arises when t = l, i.e.
when the authorities confiscate all wage income, and thereafter
hands out an equal amount, a, to everyone. We approach this
first best optimal situation when t ~ 1-.
Let us now look at the case where the distortions of educational
choices are minimized. In this model there can be both over- and
underinvestment in education, depending on the values of sand
t. We define:
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A - (l-t) wE (1+g1 (S )~) /(l-s)cl (e )n n ~I n n (9 )
B ::wE/c I (e )n n n (10)
A is the fraction of marginal benefits from education to margi-n
nal costs. B expresses what this fraction would have been inn
the absence of taxes and sUbsidies, and with all external
effects internalized.3)
When A > B , we have overinvestment in education, A < B im-n n n n
plies underinvestment, whereas A = B means a first best leveln n
of investments.
If we could individualize t or s, we could always ensure that
peoplels investment in education were at the first best levels
by setting:
(l-s)!(l-t») n = 1 + gl (Sn);i- (11)
This follows immediately from comparing the def.inition of A n
is generally evaluated at different
and
B . Unfortunately, as gl
n
points for different workers, we cannot reach the first best
optimum when t or s cannot be individualized, as is the assump-
tion of this paper. We must then set (l-s)!(l-t) so as to mini-
mize the sum of the cost of distortions of investments in educa-
tion. However, in one particular case we do not need individual-
ized taxes: As t + 1-, S + O ø n . Then gl(S ) + gl (O)ltn,which inn n
turn implies that (l-s)/(l-t) should be the same for all
workers.
Special attention should be paid to the case when s = t = l. In
this case A is not defined. When s = t = l, the state pays all
n
education and gets all the returns from it. Hence, workers are
indifferent as to their length of education. One possible
assumption in this case would be that when people are indif-
ferent, the state can instruct people what to do. Obviously, the
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state would then instruct people to choose the first best levels
of education. This means that the state reaches a first best
optimum, with the value of status in society maximized (this
maximal value is zero) and no distortions of people's choices of
education, if it sets
s = t = l (12 )
However, I do not find it very attractive to assume that the
state can instruct people how much to educate themselves. In-
stead, I will investigate what happens when s = t + 1-, when the
lump sum tax element a at the same time is adjusted so as to
meet the public budget constraint. By l'Hopital's rule we ob-
tain:
lim
s=t+l
A = wL (l+g' (O)~)/c' (e )n N n n (13)
This means that there is overinvestment in education when
s = t + 1-, since lim A > B .n n
Taking all these arguments together, we realize that the solu-
tion approaches a first best optimum as
t + l (14)
(1-s) N-l +
(l-t) + (l + g' (O)-rr-) (15)
Note that (15) implies that as t + 1-, also s + l , but in such
a way that we always have s < t. E.g., if N is a large number so
N-lthat ~ ~ l, if g'(O) = 2, and if we have set t = 0.99, then
optimal s will be 0.97.
When t is arbitrarily close to one, the value of status in so-
ciety is arbitrarily close to its maximum value. At the same
time, when t + 1-, we know that it is possible to realize a
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first best level of education without the use of personalized
educational subsidies. We use t to tax away differences in
status. Then we use s to correct people's incentives to under-
take education, but due to the inherent tendency to overinvest-
ment in education when status matters, we set s somewhat below
t. But as t + 1-, so will s.
Here, as opposed to a model with no status, educational subsi-
dies have an independent role to play. SUbsidizing education is
not merely another way of lowering the tax on the resulting
labour income. This is so, because (by assumption) educational
choices are governed by life-time utility considerations, where-
as status depends on after tax labour income. This means that
raising s and lowering t have asymmetric impacts on people's
status.
Note the importance of the assumption of no lending/borrowing
possihilities. A joint use of sand t moves income from period 2
to period l, while at the same time maintaining incentives to
undertake education. If innividuals had access to credit mar-
kets, they could of course move income back to period 2, the
period where income yields status.
In the present model inequality was "counterproductive" in the
sense that it reduced the total value of status in society.
Naturally, it could be that inequality was counterproductive
also in the sense that it lowered the production of physical
goods. It could e.g. influence worker motivation, cooperation
among workers, informal information flows in firms. As long as
it is inequality in after tax labour income which is counterpro-
ductive, whereas life-time considerations rule educational choi-
ce, the basic insights of the model will survive.
Of course, conditions (14) and (IS) must by no means be taken
literally. The full equalization of everybody's after tax labour
income is only optimal because we have assumed labour supply to
be inelastic. In this section, I have tried to present the gist
of my argument, by means of a very simple model. In the next
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se~tion we analyze more formally an extended version of the
model.
3. An Extended Model.
The most restrictive assumption of the preceding section is the
assumption of constant labour supply. In the model of section 2
only educational decisions and not labour supply decisions was
affected by taxes and subsidies. In real life we know that tax-
ation of labour income will distort labour supply decisions. To
increase t means to reduce inequality, but in this broader per-
spective inequality has both productive and counterproductive
effects. It is productive to allow inequality, because labour
income taxation distorts labour supply. The counterproductive
effect of inequality is still that the total value of status in
society is decreasing in inequality. Now, t must be set to
strike a balance between these two considerations, and it would
he highly unlikely that we would still want to drive taxation to
the point where no inequality remains, as was the prediction of
the preceding section. Let us now have a more formal look at
this.
An individual's utility in period 2 now will be written as:
u = (l-t)we L - a - heL ) + g(Sn)n2 n n n (16)
where S = (l-t)we L - a - ~ {E (l-t)we L ) - aN}n n n ~ n n n
Now L is a choice variable, and not exogenously given. The
n
disutility of work is denoted h(Ln), where hi > O, hil > O. Note
that we assume it is total after tax labour income which decides
status, and not a measure of income per hour.
With these alterations from the basic model, a representative
worker's first-order conditions will be:
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(l-s)c' (e )n n 'il n ( 17)
(l-t)we (l+g'(5 )~) = h'(L )n n ~ n 'il n (18)
These conditions simply say that the marginal after tax income
increase from more education/longer hours plus the value of
increased status due to this increase should equal the marginal
after tax cost of obtaining more education/working longer
hours.
Conditions (17) and (18) yield the demand function for education
and the supply function for labour:
e = e (s,t)n n 'rJ n (19)
L = L (s,t)n n 'il n (20)
(Remember that we have assumed that the demand for efficiency
units of labour is perfectly elastic.) The effect of s on Ln is
due to the fact that s influences e , and that the level ofn
education in turn is important for the returns from working
longer hours.
By inserting these functions into the utility function, we ob-
tain an indirect utility function, where utility is expressed as
a function of after tax "prices". This indirect utility function
will be denoted V .n
The government's problem will be to maximize
E Vn n (21)
subject to the public budget constraint
E n( t w e L - sc (e ») + aN = Tn n n n (22)
- 153 -
and
-l ( s, t ( l (23)
Some notation: e , e t' L and L t are partial derivaties ofns n ns n
e and L with respect to sand t. y is the Lagrangian multiplern n
associated with the constraint. We assume that local optimality
also imply global optimality, and that the optimum is interior.
The first-order conditions are:
-N + yN = O (24)
E {-(l-s) c'(e )e t + (l-t) w(L e t + eLt) - wL en n n n n n n n n
- h'(L )L t + g'eS ) [-we L + (l-t) w(L e t + eLt)n n n n n n n n n
+ y E {we L + tw(L e t + eLt) - s c'(e )e t} = O (25)n n n n n n n n n n
E {c (e ) - (1-s) C I (e )e + (1-t) w(L e + eL)n n n n n ns n ns n ns
+ y L { tw(L e + eL) - sc I (e )e - c (e >) = O (26)n n ns n ns n n ns n n
By making use of the individual first-order conditions (17) and
(18), we can eliminate a whole series of terms from (25) and
(26). Further by noting that (24) implies y = I, more terms can
be eliminated. We can now restate (25) and (26) as:
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+ (twL -sc' (e »e t + t w eLt = On n n n n n (27)
+ (twL -sc'(e »e + t w eL} = On n ns n ns (28)
Condition (27) says that part of the effect an increase of t has
on the value of status in optimum should equal the negative of
the net increase in tax revenue due to changes in labour supply
and educational length following an increase in t. Condition
(28) can be given a parallel interpretation.
"This sounds very cryptic, but it turns out that these conditions
have rather straightforward intuitive interpretations.
Let us start with (27). Raising t has three effects: First it
has a direct effect on status. Further it influences education,
which in turn influences the productivity of workers, costs of
schooling, and status. The third effect is the effect on labour
supply, which also in turn influences worker productivities,
disutilities of worK, and status.
However, parts of these effects are of the second order, i.e.,
they cancel out when we take into account that individuals opti-
mize. The elements in (27) represent the three effects mentioned
above, after second-order effects have been eliminated.
So now we can interpret (27) as follows: Increased taxation
reduces the negative external effects from status-seeking, but
at the same time distorts e and L . These effects must ben n
balanced in optimum. Condition (28) can be interpreted in a
parallel way.
Anyone familiar with the theory of optimal taxation will recog-
nize the structure of these results. Status-seeking is but an
example of reciprocal negative externalities. The theory of
taxation with status-seeking will therefore be nothing but an
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example of the theory of taxation with externalities.4) In this
light, the main point of the present paper is that a certain
activity (here: consumption) might have different external
effects at different points in time. This makes it optimal for
the government to use taxes and subsidies to control the distri-
bution over time of the externality-generating activity.
In order more fully to capture the intuition behind (27) and
(28), I think the following thought experiment might be instruc-
tive: In the previous section we saw that in optimum there was,
so to speak, a strict division of labour between t and s. twas
used to minimize inequality of after tax labour income, whereas
s was used to restore incentives to undertake education. We
could envisage that we also in the present setting would want
there to be such a strict "division of labour". Then, t would be
used to strike a balance between the wish to minimize differ-
ences of status and the wish to minimize distortions of labour
supply. Moreover, s could be used to restore educational incen-
tives to the best level achievable, given that personalized
subsidies cannot be taken into use. If e.g. optimal t is less
than one,'we would have to choose s < t < l, because of the
tendency to overinvest in education.
However, such a procedure would generally not be optimal. A
subsidy on education does not only influence education, but also
labour supply. This in turn influences the optimal trade-off
between status considerations and distortions of labour supply.
Moreover, when s is not set at the first best level, we have to
take into account that t influences education when determining
optimal t. Precisely these considerations are reflected in (27)
and (28). Tifesee that the interplay between sand t here is
rather more complicated than in the previous model, there is no
longer a strict "division of lahour".
Let us have a brief look at the case where Ln = Ln, i.e., we
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return to the simpler version of the model we looked at in the
previous section. Conditions (27) and (28) then can be restated
as:
+ (twE-sc' (e »e t} = O (29)n n n
We have already argued that when t + 1-, it follows from con-
cavity of g that the total value of status approaches its maxi-
mum value. This means that as t + l , the derivatives of the
total value of status with respect to t and s approaches zero.
Therefore, the first main terms both of (29) and (30) are zero.
Moreover, we know that if we set s according to (15), we
approach the first best levels of education where wE = c'(e )n n
~ n. Hence, the second of the main terms of (29) and (30) are
zero. This means that when we choose t and s according to (14)
and (15), the first-order conditions (29) and (30) are arbi-
trarily close to being satisfied.
Returning to the more general case, we remember the restriction
(23). A natural alternative restriction might be
O c s,t <; l (34)
In this case we have new possibilities of corner solutions. E.g.
it might be that g is almost linear, so that there is little to
be gained by reducing inequality. At the same time the cost of
distorting labour supply might be very substantial. This could
lead us to a corner solution where t = O. When s = t = O, there
is a tendency to overinvestment in education, so what we really
would want is to tax education. As this is blocked by (34) , we
set s = O. Ne see that within such a setting the main points of
this paper become irrelevant.
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4. Conclusions.
This paper postulates that relative income, or "status", enters
people's utility functions, and that the total value of status
in society is largest when inequality is minimized. I propose
that a natural measure for "status" is relative labour income
after tax in the years after a concluded education. Moreover, I
suggest that educational decisions are undertaken in order to
maximize lifetime utility. This leads to a situation where it
might be optimal to tax away some of the differences in people's
labour income - and to use educational subsidies to restore
people's incentives to undertake education.
The presented model is admittedly speculative, in that its main
point is based on a specification of people's utility functions
for which I offer no empirical justification. Personally I feel
the model captures a point of some importance. Admittedly, such
simple models offer only the vaguest guidelines for public poli-
cy. But I think it is equally ad hoc and equally little support-
ed by empirical evidence (although much more common) to base
policy recommendations on the assumption that status does not
enter people's utility functions. What seems to be needed is
much more thorough empirical knowledge about what really governs
people's choices.
Some might argue that status enters people's motivation struc-
ture in a more complicated way than described here. Status might
not only depend on income per se, but also on the purchase of
different goods. Some goods - "positional goods" - might yield
more status than others, and precisely education might be one
such positional good. Moreover, it might be that movements up or
down a ladder of relative positions have different impact. I
fully agree with these arguments. But as long as an increase in
disposable income during one's education and a corresponding de-
crease in the years after a concluded education do not leave
utility derived from status unchanged, my main point will hold
in some modified form.
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Notes.
* I thank Geir Asheim and Kåre Petter Hagen for valuable
comments.
l) w can ve thought of as gifts from parents, government grants,
earning capacity in the first period, etc. The exact inter-
pretation of w determines the realism of the assumption that
w is untaxed.
2) I have here chosen to model educational costs as pecuniary
costs only. Realistically, a large part of the costs in edu-
cation is the alternative value of time. Including such time
costs would not change the flavour of my results, but would
be notationally awkward.
3) A first best solution arises when there are no distortions
from taxes or subsidies, and when the negative externalities
from consumption in period two are fully internalized. If
this were the case, optimal choice of e is described by:n
wI. ( l +g I (S » = L g I (S ) • wI. + c I (e )n nnW' n
If the first best situation should imply, as it turns out
that it does within the present model, that everybody has the
same income and status in optimum, the relationship can be
rewritten as:
wE = c I (e )n
This implies condition (10).
4) Some contributions to the theory of optimal taxation with
externalities are Baumol and Oates (197S), Diamond and
Mirrlees (1973), Hagen (1978) and Sandmo (1980).
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